| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Moyster <oysterized@gmail.com>
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Ever since commit 45f035ab9b8f ("CONFIG_HOTPLUG should be always on"),
it has been basically impossible to build a kernel with CONFIG_HOTPLUG
turned off. Remove all the remaining references to it.
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Doug Thompson <dougthompson@xmission.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.
Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.
This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.
Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.
One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).
Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.
Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.
Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
[wt: backport to 4.4: adjust context ; drop ppc hugetlb_radix changes]
[wt: backport to 3.18: adjust context ; no FOLL_POPULATE ;
s390 uses generic arch_get_unmapped_area()]
[wt: backport to 3.16: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 3.10: adjust context ; code logic in PARISC's
arch_get_unmapped_area() wasn't found ; code inserted into
expand_upwards() and expand_downwards() runs under anon_vma lock;
changes for gup.c:faultin_page go to memory.c:__get_user_pages();
included Hugh Dickins' fixes]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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(cherry picked from commit https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/2/4/833)
Replace calls to get_random_int() followed by a cast to (unsigned long)
with calls to get_random_long(). Also address shifting bug which, in case
of x86 removed entropy mask for mmap_rnd_bits values > 31 bits.
Bug: 26963541
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com>
Change-Id: Ie577b21a0678cf4b21eae06bddd8ccb27cbe70ff
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This commit is the result of
find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -i 's/ __cpuinit / /g'
find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -i 's/ __cpuexit / /g'
find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -i 's/ __cpuinitdata / /g'
find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -i 's/ __cpuinit$//g'
find ./arch/ -name '*.h' | xargs sed -i 's/ __cpuinit//g'
find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -i 's/^__cpuinit //g'
find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -i 's/^__cpuinitdata //g'
find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -i 's/\*__cpuinit /\*/g'
find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -i 's/ __cpuinitconst / /g'
find . -name '*.h' | xargs sed -i 's/ __cpuinit / /g'
find . -name '*.h' | xargs sed -i 's/ __cpuinitdata / /g'
git add .
git reset include/linux/init.h
git checkout -- include/linux/init.h
based off : https://github.com/jollaman999/jolla-kernel_bullhead/commit/bc15db84a622eed7d61d3ece579b577154d0ec29
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commit f077aaf0754bcba0fffdbd925bc12f09cd1e38aa upstream.
In commit c60ac5693c47 ("powerpc: Update kernel VSID range", 2013-03-13)
we lost a check on the region number (the top four bits of the effective
address) for addresses below PAGE_OFFSET. That commit replaced a check
that the top 18 bits were all zero with a check that bits 46 - 59 were
zero (performed for all addresses, not just user addresses).
This means that userspace can access an address like 0x1000_0xxx_xxxx_xxxx
and we will insert a valid SLB entry for it. The VSID used will be the
same as if the top 4 bits were 0, but the page size will be some random
value obtained by indexing beyond the end of the mm_ctx_high_slices_psize
array in the paca. If that page size is the same as would be used for
region 0, then userspace just has an alias of the region 0 space. If the
page size is different, then no HPTE will be found for the access, and
the process will get a SIGSEGV (since hash_page_mm() will refuse to create
a HPTE for the bogus address).
The access beyond the end of the mm_ctx_high_slices_psize can be at most
5.5MB past the array, and so will be in RAM somewhere. Since the access
is a load performed in real mode, it won't fault or crash the kernel.
At most this bug could perhaps leak a little bit of information about
blocks of 32 bytes of memory located at offsets of i * 512kB past the
paca->mm_ctx_high_slices_psize array, for 1 <= i <= 11.
Fixes: c60ac5693c47 ("powerpc: Update kernel VSID range")
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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