| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Memset on a local variable may be removed when it is called just before the
variable goes out of scope. Using memzero_explicit defeats this
optimization. A simplified version of the semantic patch that makes this
change is as follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)
// <smpl>
@@
identifier x;
type T;
@@
{
... when any
T x[...];
... when any
when exists
- memset
+ memzero_explicit
(x,
-0,
...)
... when != x
when strict
}
// </smpl>
This change was suggested by Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Change-Id: I89b5957f922b7e5568a405c212eb186449f1deab
(cherry picked from commit 025f4cbff16e284192b04bfa1f7b19551c1f5af3)
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memzero_explicit should be used instead in order to prevent
the compiler from optimising away zeroing.
Change-Id: I248925e4c3e934a98f1341b6649ca7cb200a7781
(cherry picked from commit af92d4cf4b0a9ffc39fbd242c2659267ea62fb97)
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Almost clean cherry pick of c6e9d6f38894798696f23c8084ca7edbf16ee895,
includes change made by merge 0891ad829d2a0501053703df66029e843e3b8365.
The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
developers. It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
OpenBSD.
The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against
file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all
available file descriptors, forcing the use of the fallback code where
/dev/[u]random is not available. Since the fallback code is often not
well-tested, it is better to eliminate this potential failure mode
entirely.
The other feature provided by this new system call is the ability to
request randomness from the /dev/urandom entropy pool, but to block
until at least 128 bits of entropy has been accumulated in the
/dev/urandom entropy pool. Historically, the emphasis in the
/dev/urandom development has been to ensure that urandom pool is
initialized as quickly as possible after system boot, and preferably
before the init scripts start execution.
This is because changing /dev/urandom reads to block represents an
interface change that could potentially break userspace which is not
acceptable. In practice, on most x86 desktop and server systems, in
general the entropy pool can be initialized before it is needed (and
in modern kernels, we will printk a warning message if not). However,
on an embedded system, this may not be the case. And so with this new
interface, we can provide the functionality of blocking until the
urandom pool has been initialized. Any userspace program which uses
this new functionality must take care to assure that if it is used
during the boot process, that it will not cause the init scripts or
other portions of the system startup to hang indefinitely.
SYNOPSIS
#include <linux/random.h>
int getrandom(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
The system call getrandom() fills the buffer pointed to by buf
with up to buflen random bytes which can be used to seed user
space random number generators (i.e., DRBG's) or for other
cryptographic uses. It should not be used for Monte Carlo
simulations or other programs/algorithms which are doing
probabilistic sampling.
If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
/dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool. The
/dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be
obtained from environmental noise, so if there is insufficient
entropy, the requested number of bytes may not be returned.
If there is no entropy available at all, getrandom(2) will
either block, or return an error with errno set to EAGAIN if
the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags.
If the GRND_RANDOM bit is not set, then the /dev/urandom pool
will be used. Unlike using read(2) to fetch data from
/dev/urandom, if the urandom pool has not been sufficiently
initialized, getrandom(2) will block (or return -1 with the
errno set to EAGAIN if the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags).
The getentropy(2) system call in OpenBSD can be emulated using
the following function:
int getentropy(void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int ret;
if (buflen > 256)
goto failure;
ret = getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret == buflen)
return 0;
failure:
errno = EIO;
return -1;
}
RETURN VALUE
On success, the number of bytes that was filled in the buf is
returned. This may not be all the bytes requested by the
caller via buflen if insufficient entropy was present in the
/dev/random pool, or if the system call was interrupted by a
signal.
On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately.
ERRORS
EINVAL An invalid flag was passed to getrandom(2)
EFAULT buf is outside the accessible address space.
EAGAIN The requested entropy was not available, and
getentropy(2) would have blocked if the
GRND_NONBLOCK flag was not set.
EINTR While blocked waiting for entropy, the call was
interrupted by a signal handler; see the description
of how interrupted read(2) calls on "slow" devices
are handled with and without the SA_RESTART flag
in the signal(7) man page.
NOTES
For small requests (buflen <= 256) getrandom(2) will not
return EINTR when reading from the urandom pool once the
entropy pool has been initialized, and it will return all of
the bytes that have been requested. This is the recommended
way to use getrandom(2), and is designed for compatibility
with OpenBSD's getentropy() system call.
However, if you are using GRND_RANDOM, then getrandom(2) may
block until the entropy accounting determines that sufficient
environmental noise has been gathered such that getrandom(2)
will be operating as a NRBG instead of a DRBG for those people
who are working in the NIST SP 800-90 regime. Since it may
block for a long time, these guarantees do *not* apply. The
user may want to interrupt a hanging process using a signal,
so blocking until all of the requested bytes are returned
would be unfriendly.
For this reason, the user of getrandom(2) MUST always check
the return value, in case it returns some error, or if fewer
bytes than requested was returned. In the case of
!GRND_RANDOM and small request, the latter should never
happen, but the careful userspace code (and all crypto code
should be careful) should check for this anyway!
Finally, unless you are doing long-term key generation (and
perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using
GRND_RANDOM. The cryptographic algorithms used for
/dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be
sufficient for all purposes. The disadvantage of GRND_RANDOM
is that it can block, and the increased complexity required to
deal with partially fulfilled getrandom(2) requests.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zach Brown <zab@zabbo.net>
Bug: http://b/29621447
Change-Id: I189ba74070dd6d918b0fdf83ff30bb74ec0f7556
(cherry picked from commit 4af712e8df998475736f3e2727701bd31e3751a9)
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* Syscalls need to be greater than __NR_last_syscall+1 in order to
account for the padding in the syscall table
Change-Id: Ide15e25e8a2287fff29c75d898c935318b660ea2
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eb6452537b280652eee66801ec97cc369e27e5d8.
Add the new getrandom syscall for ARM.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Bug: http://b/29621447
Change-Id: I6d50b57f3a61fbf9102c69103b9a5b7ebf239860
(cherry picked from commit eb6452537b280652eee66801ec97cc369e27e5d8)
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BUG:67857304
Change-Id: I7bb176458bd6b8d62218dea3e5e9a9d815afc5ee
Signed-off-by: Piazza Lo <piazza.lo@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Moyster <oysterized@gmail.com>
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ioremap_cache is more aligned with other architectures.
There are only 2 users of this in the kernel: pxa2xx-flash and Xen.
This fixes Xen build failures on arm64:
drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c:233:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'ioremap_cached' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
drivers/xen/grant-table.c:1174:3: error: implicit declaration of function 'ioremap_cached' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_probe.c:778:4: error: implicit declaration of function 'ioremap_cached' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <rob.herring@calxeda.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Git-commit: 0a5ccc86507f45b80831dac1049197c4d45be955
[joonwoop@codeaurora.org: fixed trivial merge conflict.]
Signed-off-by: Joonwoo Park <joonwoop@codeaurora.org>
Change-Id: I867b893aa63bc8647ed0d7cbf66b7fbb464ef8f0
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Change-Id: I567349ba54959b45e817e8ebacbb8babca1ca453
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Git-Repo: git://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
Git-commit: 22d4102f778df9cab47e871b8de3400f6e685378
Signed-off-by: Abhimanyu Kapur <abhimany@codeaurora.org>
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Prevent speculation at the syscall table decoding by clamping the index
used to zero on invalid system call numbers, and using the csdb
speculative barrier.
Change-Id: I59151ce75a3887d88eed852187f05013e665a7cb
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
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Add an implementation of the array_index_mask_nospec() function for
mitigating Spectre variant 1 throughout the kernel.
Change-Id: I66d16e24b4725df0bf70f53c91a34be9f26fba98
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
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Add assembly and C macros for the new CSDB instruction.
Change-Id: Iff3490a0ebc290edf22128eba9e367dc5134fb3e
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
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Harden the branch predictor against Spectre v2 attacks on context
switches for ARMv7 and later CPUs. We do this by:
Cortex A9, A12, A17, A73, A75: invalidating the BTB.
Cortex A15, Brahma B15: invalidating the instruction cache.
Cortex A57 and Cortex A72 are not addressed in this patch.
Cortex R7 and Cortex R8 are also not addressed as we do not enforce
memory protection on these cores.
Change-Id: Ic2fb57dd40b6f7fc22a62f267ab24441ab09cc4b
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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Add a Kconfig symbol for CPUs which are vulnerable to the Spectre
attacks.
Change-Id: I63aeb80cb82f9de4ddbb3bf83fefd5b0ce4237ba
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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is_vmalloc_addr current assumes that all vmalloc addresses
exist between VMALLOC_START and VMALLOC_END. This may not be
the case when interleaving vmalloc and lowmem. Update the
is_vmalloc_addr to properly check for this.
Change-Id: I5def3d6ae1a4de59ea36f095b8c73649a37b1f36
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <lauraa@codeaurora.org>
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[suggested by Rasmus Villemoes] make O_DIRECTORY | O_RDWR part of O_TMPFILE;
that will fail on old kernels in a lot more cases than what I came up with.
And make sure O_CREAT doesn't get there...
Change-Id: Iaa3c8b487d44515b539150bdb5d0b749b87d3ea2
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Change-Id: I0adb8fe9c5029bad3ac52629003c3b78e9442936
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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arch/arm/mach-tegra/pm.c, kernel/power/console.c and mm/vmpressure.c
were somehow getting slab.h indirectly through cgroup.h which in turn
was getting it indirectly through xattr.h. A scheduled cgroup change
drops xattr.h inclusion from cgroup.h and breaks compilation of these
three files. Add explicit slab.h includes to the three files.
A pending cgroup patch depends on this change and it'd be great if
this can be routed through cgroup/for-3.14-fixes branch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@wwwdotorg.org>
Cc: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-tegra@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Joe Maples <joe@frap129.org>
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fixes : [ 206.299213]<1> (1)[1:init]android_reboot: Failed to open sysrq-trigger.
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commit dd665be0e243873343a28e18f9f345927b658daf upstream.
gcc-6.0 warns about comparisons between two identical expressions,
which is what we get in the floppy driver when writing to the FD_DOR
register:
drivers/block/floppy.c: In function 'set_dor':
drivers/block/floppy.c:810:44: error: self-comparison always evaluates to true [-Werror=tautological-compare]
fd_outb(newdor, FD_DOR);
It would be nice to use a static inline function instead of the
macro, to avoid the warning, but we cannot do that because the
FD_DOR definition is incomplete at this point.
Adding a cast to (u32) is a harmless way to shut up the warning,
just not very nice.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 543097843ca7c9ac3758d0b5879ea2a6f44089de upstream.
On a cross-toolchain without glibc support, libgcov may not be
available, and attempting to build an arm64 kernel with GCOV
enabled then results in a build error:
/home/arnd/cross-gcc/lib/gcc/aarch64-linux/5.2.1/../../../../aarch64-linux/bin/ld: cannot find -lgcov
We don't really want to link libgcov into the vdso anyway, so
this patch just disables GCOV in the vdso directory, just as
we do for most other architectures.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This reverts commit ff505baaf412985af758d5820cd620ed9f1a7e05.
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[Upstream: fb8722735f50cd51204bfbeefa2e5e7e9ff5b2be]
[Upstream: 9bfe7553fadb269e45a6e10f68b727957dff5676]
Versions of gcc prior to gcc 5 emitted a __multi3 function call when
dealing with TI types, resulting in failures when trying to link to
libgcc, and more generally, bad performance. However, since gcc 5,
the compiler supports actually emitting fast instructions, which means
we can at long last enable this option and receive the speedups.
The gcc commit that added proper Aarch64 support is:
https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commitdiff;h=d1ae7bb994f49316f6f63e6173f2931e837a351d
This commit appears to be part of the gcc 5 release.
There are still a few instructions, __lshrti3, __ashlti3, and __ashrti3,
which require libgcc, which is fine. Rather than linking to libgcc, we
simply provide them ourselves, since they're not that complicated.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
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This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Moyster <oysterized@gmail.com>
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When the patch for e16343c47e42 (ARM: 8160/1: drop warning about
return_address not using unwind tables) was created there was still more
code in said branch. Probably this simplification was just missed during
conflict resolution when the patch was applied.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
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Use the global current_stack_pointer to get the value of the stack pointer.
This change supports being able to compile the kernel with both gcc and Clang.
Signed-off-by: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Charlebois <charlebm@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan-Simon Möller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
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The warning was introduced in 2009 (commit 4bf1fa5a34aa ([ARM] 5613/1:
implement CALLER_ADDRESSx)). The only "problem" here is that
CALLER_ADDRESSx for x > 1 returns NULL which doesn't do much harm.
The drawback of implementing a fix (i.e. use unwind tables to implement CALLER_ADDRESSx) is that much of the unwinder code would need to be marked as not
traceable.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
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With compilers which follow the C99 standard (like modern versions of gcc and
clang), "extern inline" does the wrong thing (emits code for an externally
linkable version of the inline function). In this case using static inline
and removing the NULL version of return_address in return_address.c does
the right thing.
Signed-off-by: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Charlebois <charlebm@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
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While building lsk-3.10-android branch, we run into a series
of build warnings for arm64 arch:
----------
In file included from arch/arm64/kernel/kuser32.S:32:0:
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h:24:0: warning: "__NR_restart_syscall" redefined
#define __NR_restart_syscall 0
^
In file included from include/asm-generic/unistd.h:1:0,
from arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h:16,
from arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h:50,
from arch/arm64/kernel/kuser32.S:31:
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h:390:0: note: this is the location of the previous definition
#define __NR_restart_syscall 128
^
In file included from arch/arm64/kernel/kuser32.S:32:0:
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h:26:0: warning: "__NR_exit" redefined
#define __NR_exit 1
^
In file included from include/asm-generic/unistd.h:1:0,
from arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h:16,
from arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h:50,
from arch/arm64/kernel/kuser32.S:31:
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h:292:0: note: this is the location of the previous definition
#define __NR_exit 93
^
----------
This fix removes asm/unitstd32.h include to avoid duplication of
"__NR_" syscall definitions. It is based on mainline commit:
f3e5c847ec3d "arm64: Add __NR_* definitions for compat syscalls".
The corresponding change in AOSP (commit: cfc7e99e9e39, "arm64: Add..")
seem to be the early version or backport of the above mainline
commit to aosp/android-3.10. The only difference between mainline and
aosp commit is that the latter didn't have to deal with that
problematic include because it is not present in aosp/android-3.10
unlike mainline or lsk-v3.10-android tree.
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Hilman <khilman@linaro.org>
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Signed-off-by: mydongistiny <jaysonedson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mister Oyster <oysterized@gmail.com>
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Building kernels before linux-4.7 with gcc-8 results in many build failures
when gcc triggers a check that was meant to catch broken compilers:
/tmp/ccCGMQmS.s:648: Error: .err encountered
According to the discussion in the gcc bugzilla, a local "register
asm()" variable is still supposed to be the correct way to force an
inline assembly to use a particular register, but marking it 'const'
lets the compiler do optimizations that break that, i.e the compiler is
free to treat the variable as either 'const' or 'register' in that case.
Upstream commit 9f73bd8bb445 ("ARM: uaccess: remove put_user() code
duplication") fixed this problem in linux-4.8 as part of a larger change,
but seems a little too big to be backported to 4.4.
Let's take the simplest fix and change only the one broken line in the
same way as newer kernels.
Suggested-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=85745
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=86673
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
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Stack mapping entropy is currently hard-wired to 11 bits of entropy on
32-bit and 18 bits of entropy on 64-bit. The stack itself gains an extra
8 bits of entropy from lower bit randomization within 16 byte alignment
constraints. The argument block could have all lower bits randomized but
it currently only gets the mapping randomization.
Rather than hard-wiring values this switches to using the mmap entropy
configuration like the mmap base and executable base, resulting in a
range of 8 to 16 bits on 32-bit and 18 to 24 bits on 64-bit (with 4k
pages) depending on kernel configuration and overridable via the sysctl
entries.
It's worth noting that since these kernel configuration options default
to the minimum supported entropy value, the entropy on 32-bit will drop
from 11 to 8 bits for builds using the defaults. However, following the
configuration seems like the right thing to do regardless. At the very
least, changing the defaults for COMPAT (32-bit processes on 64-bit)
should be considered due to the larger address space compared to real
32-bit.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
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The stack ASLR base was not included in the gap size for rlimit values
larger than MIN_GAP, resulting in insufficient space being reserved.
PaX uses an alternate approach where the mmap base is instead offset
from the actual random stack base, but this works for the time being.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
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Bug: 68266545
Change-Id: I6005a6e944494257bfc2243fde2f7a09c3fd76c6
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We now trap accesses to CNTVCT_EL0 when the counter is broken
enough to require the kernel to mediate the access. But it
turns out that some existing userspace (such as OpenMPI) do
probe for the counter frequency, leading to an UNDEF exception
as CNTVCT_EL0 and CNTFRQ_EL0 share the same control bit.
The fix is to handle the exception the same way we do for CNTVCT_EL0.
Bug: 68266545
Fixes: a86bd139f2ae ("arm64: arch_timer: Enable CNTVCT_EL0 trap if workaround is enabled")
Reported-by: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9842119a238bfb92cbab63258dabb54f0e7b111b)
Change-Id: Ie5a9a93fcca238d6097ecacd6df0e540be90220b
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Since people seem to make a point in breaking the userspace visible
counter, we have no choice but to trap the access. Add the required
handler.
Bug: 68266545
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6126ce0588eb5a0752d5c8b5796a7fca324fd887)
Change-Id: I0705f47c85a78040df38df18f51a4a22500b904d
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Revert "crypto: arm64/sha2 - add generated .S files to .gitignore"
This reverts commit 9345ccbf273209e3946c3981122d068221a135d2.
Revert "crypto: arm64/sha2 - integrate OpenSSL implementations of SHA256/SHA512"
This reverts commit 02ea19edc643061fab3b6ea8bd54b96110a9f43b.
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