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The SHA256-based password hashing algorithm used by slcl(1) and
usergen(1) is considered insecure against several kinds of attacks,
including brute force attacks. [1]
Therefore, a stronger password hashing algorithm based on the Argon2id
key derivation function is now used by default. While OpenSSL does
support Argon2id, it is only supported by very recent versions [2],
which are still not packaged by most distributions as of the time of
this writing. [3]
As an alternative to OpenSSL, libsodium [4] had several benefits:
- It provides easy-to-use functions for password hashing, base64
encoding/decoding and other cryptographic primitives used by slcl(1)
and usergen(1).
- It is packaged by most distributions [5], and most often only the patch
version differs, which ensures good compatibility across distributions.
Unfortunately, and as opposed to OpenSSL, libsodium does not come with
command-line tools. Therefore, usergen(1) had to be rewritten in C.
In order to maintain backwards compatiblity with existing databases,
slcl(1) and usergen(1) shall support the insecure, SHA256-based password
hashing algorithm. However, Argon2id shall now be the default choice for
usergen(1).
[1]: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/195563/why-is-sha-256-not-good-for-passwords
[2]: https://docs.openssl.org/3.3/man7/EVP_KDF-ARGON2/
[3]: https://repology.org/project/openssl/versions
[4]: https://www.libsodium.org/
[5]: https://repology.org/project/libsodium/versions
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LICENSE is not copied to the installation prefix, so adding a short
copyright notice instead might be a better reference.
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This feature was already implemented by:
commit 0822a982ef3b085dc109ec373ff537974503eb04
Author: Xavier Del Campo Romero <xavi.dcr@tutanota.com>
Date: Sat Jul 8 00:54:59 2023 +0200
Implement file/directory removal
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Despite designed around portability and minimalism, I feel slcl no
longer aligns with the philosophical views from the suckless project.
Therefore, I think it was appropriate to unlink its branding from it.
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- User quota was implemented by commit ff8da797a.
- Public file sharing was implemented by commit 2e1b1313.
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This feature allows admins to set a specific quota for each user, in
MiB. This feature is particularly useful for shared instances, where
unlimited user storage might be unfeasible or even dangerous for the
server.
Also, a nice HTML5 <progress> element has been added to the site that
shows how much of the quota has been consumed.
If no quota is set, slcl falls back to the default behaviour i.e.,
assume unlimited storage.
Limitations:
- While HTTP does specify a Content-Length, which determines the length
of the whole request, it does not specify how many files are involved
or their individual sizes.
- Because of this, if multiple files are uploaded simultaneously, the
whole request would be dropped if user quota is exceeded, even if not
all files exceeded it.
- Also, Content-Length adds the length of some HTTP boilerplate
(e.g.: boundaries), but slcl must rely on this before accepting the
whole request. In other words, this means some requests might be
rejected by slcl because of the extra bytes caused by such boilerplate.
- When the quota is exceeded, slcl must close the connection so that
the rest of the transfer is cancelled. Unfortunately, this means no
HTML can be sent back to the customer to inform about the situation.
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