| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| * | xattr: Constify ->name member of "struct xattr". | Tetsuo Handa | 2019-07-06 | 1 | -1/+1 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since everybody sets kstrdup()ed constant string to "struct xattr"->name but nobody modifies "struct xattr"->name , we can omit kstrdup() and its failure checking by constifying ->name member of "struct xattr". Change-Id: I84a47af13e3c77b394218cc12ac8901d87b0fd69 Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> [ocfs2] Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Tested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> | ||||
| * | EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons | Ryan Ware | 2017-06-17 | 1 | -1/+2 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1 upstream. This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp(). Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq(). Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | ||||
| * | first commit | Meizu OpenSource | 2016-08-15 | 7 | -0/+929 |
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