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There are many drivers in the kernel which can hold on
to lots of memory. It can be useful to dump out all those
drivers at key points in the kernel. Introduct a notifier
framework for dumping this information. When the notifiers
are called, drivers can dump out the state of any memory
they may be using.
Change-Id: Ifb2946964bf5d072552dd56d8d6dfdd794af6d84
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <lauraa@codeaurora.org>
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This reverts commit ff505baaf412985af758d5820cd620ed9f1a7e05.
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Signed-off-by: mydongistiny <jaysonedson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mister Oyster <oysterized@gmail.com>
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zbud is an special purpose allocator for storing compressed pages. It
is designed to store up to two compressed pages per physical page.
While this design limits storage density, it has simple and
deterministic reclaim properties that make it preferable to a higher
density approach when reclaim will be used.
zbud works by storing compressed pages, or "zpages", together in pairs
in a single memory page called a "zbud page". The first buddy is "left
justifed" at the beginning of the zbud page, and the last buddy is
"right justified" at the end of the zbud page. The benefit is that if
either buddy is freed, the freed buddy space, coalesced with whatever
slack space that existed between the buddies, results in the largest
possible free region within the zbud page.
zbud also provides an attractive lower bound on density. The ratio of
zpages to zbud pages can not be less than 1. This ensures that zbud can
never "do harm" by using more pages to store zpages than the
uncompressed zpages would have used on their own.
This implementation is a rewrite of the zbud allocator internally used
by zcache in the driver/staging tree. The rewrite was necessary to
remove some of the zcache specific elements that were ingrained
throughout and provide a generic allocation interface that can later be
used by zsmalloc and others.
This patch adds zbud to mm/ for later use by zswap.
Change-Id: I5120b1acd22f15c5dc3d2a0e6f1a34a73f97be3a
Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Cc: Robert Jennings <rcj@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jenifer Hopper <jhopper@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <jweiner@redhat.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Cody P Schafer <cody@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickens <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Git-commit: 4e2e2770b1529edc5849c86b29a6febe27e2f083
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
[venkatg@codeaurora.org: keep msm-3.10 changes, add zbud cfg]
Signed-off-by: Venkat Gopalakrishnan <venkatg@codeaurora.org>
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Add zpool api.
zpool provides an interface for memory storage, typically of compressed
memory. Users can select what backend to use; currently the only
implementations are zbud, a low density implementation with up to two
compressed pages per storage page, and zsmalloc, a higher density
implementation with multiple compressed pages per storage page.
Change-Id: Ie29da7d16f2f92a0fce1753eaae5629e168684c6
Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>
Tested-by: Seth Jennings <sjennings@variantweb.net>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Cc: Weijie Yang <weijie.yang@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Revert "KSM: mediatek: implement Adaptive KSM"
Revert "mm: uksm: fix maybe-uninitialized warning"
Revert "UKSM: Add Governors for Higher CPU usage (HighCPU) for more merging, and low cpu usage (Battery) for less battery drain"
Revert "uksm: use deferrable timer"
Revert "mm: limit UKSM sleep time instead of failing"
Revert "uksm: Fix warning"
Revert "uksm: clean up and remove some (no)inlines"
Revert "uksm: modify ema logic and tidy up"
Revert "uksm: enhancements and cleanups"
Revert "uksm: squashed fixups"
Revert "UKSM: cast variable as const"
Revert "UKSM: remove U64_MAX definition"
Revert "add uksm 0.1.2.3 for v3.10 .ge.46.patch"
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Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[tsoni@codeaurora.org: trivial merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: David Keitel <dkeitel@codeaurora.org>
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This patch moves zsmalloc under mm directory.
Before that, description will explain why we have needed custom
allocator.
Zsmalloc is a new slab-based memory allocator for storing compressed
pages. It is designed for low fragmentation and high allocation success
rate on large object, but <= PAGE_SIZE allocations.
zsmalloc differs from the kernel slab allocator in two primary ways to
achieve these design goals.
zsmalloc never requires high order page allocations to back slabs, or
"size classes" in zsmalloc terms. Instead it allows multiple
single-order pages to be stitched together into a "zspage" which backs
the slab. This allows for higher allocation success rate under memory
pressure.
Also, zsmalloc allows objects to span page boundaries within the zspage.
This allows for lower fragmentation than could be had with the kernel
slab allocator for objects between PAGE_SIZE/2 and PAGE_SIZE. With the
kernel slab allocator, if a page compresses to 60% of it original size,
the memory savings gained through compression is lost in fragmentation
because another object of the same size can't be stored in the leftover
space.
This ability to span pages results in zsmalloc allocations not being
directly addressable by the user. The user is given an
non-dereferencable handle in response to an allocation request. That
handle must be mapped, using zs_map_object(), which returns a pointer to
the mapped region that can be used. The mapping is necessary since the
object data may reside in two different noncontigious pages.
The zsmalloc fulfills the allocation needs for zram perfectly
[sjenning@linux.vnet.ibm.com: borrow Seth's quote]
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Luigi Semenzato <semenzato@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Conflicts:
mm/Kconfig
mm/Makefile
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Conflicts:
fs/exec.c
Signed-off-by: Stefan Guendhoer <stefan@guendhoer.com>
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