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Change-Id: Ief5582ec8c4aeb4fb7bf9b2abd51b3d65ae9e81c
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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O_TMPFILE, like O_CREAT, should respect the requested mode and should
create regular files.
This fixes two bugs: O_TMPFILE required privilege (because the mode
ended up as 000) and it produced bogus inodes with no type.
Change-Id: Ie4da9ede57e481c7edb113c5bc6329fefef41f4e
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Change-Id: I90171d1b53a4c35bfa76757ecfdfb6f95330d107
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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[suggested by Rasmus Villemoes] make O_DIRECTORY | O_RDWR part of O_TMPFILE;
that will fail on old kernels in a lot more cases than what I came up with.
And make sure O_CREAT doesn't get there...
Change-Id: Iaa3c8b487d44515b539150bdb5d0b749b87d3ea2
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Change-Id: I0adb8fe9c5029bad3ac52629003c3b78e9442936
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Moyster <oysterized@gmail.com>
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This allows filesystems to use their mount private data to
influence the permssions they use in setattr2. It has
been separated into a new call to avoid disrupting current
setattr users.
Change-Id: I19959038309284448f1b7f232d579674ef546385
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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This allows filesystems to use their mount private data to
influence the permssions they return in permission2. It has
been separated into a new call to avoid disrupting current
permission users.
Change-Id: I9d416e3b8b6eca84ef3e336bd2af89ddd51df6ca
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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Introduce FMODE_SPLICE_READ and FMODE_SPLICE_WRITE. These modes check
whether it is legal to read or write a file using splice. Both get
automatically set on regular files and are not checked when a 'struct
fileoperations' includes the splice_{read,write} methods.
Change-Id: Ice6a3fab20bf0ac131f8d908f4bb0f7dc34bf4e3
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
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commit eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87 upstream.
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
[wangkai: backport to 3.10: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Wang Kai <morgan.wang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Guendhoer <stefan@guendhoer.com>
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