| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Moyster <oysterized@gmail.com>
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Currently there is no way to truncate partial page where the end
truncate point is not at the end of the page. This is because it was not
needed and the functionality was enough for file system truncate
operation to work properly. However more file systems now support punch
hole feature and it can benefit from mm supporting truncating page just
up to the certain point.
Specifically, with this functionality truncate_inode_pages_range() can
be changed so it supports truncating partial page at the end of the
range (currently it will BUG_ON() if 'end' is not at the end of the
page).
This commit changes the invalidatepage() address space operation
prototype to accept range to be invalidated and update all the instances
for it.
We also change the block_invalidatepage() in the same way and actually
make a use of the new length argument implementing range invalidation.
Actual file system implementations will follow except the file systems
where the changes are really simple and should not change the behaviour
in any way .Implementation for truncate_page_range() which will be able
to accept page unaligned ranges will follow as well.
Change-Id: Id47992f86b307985b3215bcf141d56d1849d71df
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit d47992f86b307985b3215bcf141d56d1849d71df)
f2fs: removed f2fs modifications bcs of f2fs backports
Signed-off-by: Mister Oyster <oysterized@gmail.com>
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(https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/12/13/579)
posix_acl_update_mode() could possibly clear 'acl', if so
we leak the memory pointed by 'acl'. Save this pointer
before calling posix_acl_update_mode() and release the memory
if 'acl' really gets cleared.
Reported-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Cc: Ron Minnich <rminnich@sandia.gov>
Cc: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Bug: 32458736
Change-Id: Ia78da401e6fd1bfd569653bd2cd0ebd3f9c737a0
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(cherry pick from commit 073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef)
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
NB: conflicts resolution included extending the change to all visible
users of the near deprecated function posix_acl_equiv_mode
replaced with posix_acl_update_mode. We did not resolve the ACL
leak in this CL, require additional upstream fixes.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Bug: 32458736
Change-Id: I19591ad452cc825ac282b3cfd2daaa72aa9a1ac1
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commit 0a73d0a204a4a04a1e110539c5a524ae51f91d6d upstream.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Guendhoer <stefan@guendhoer.com>
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