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authorFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>2016-03-10 01:56:23 +0100
committerMoyster <oysterized@gmail.com>2016-11-17 12:11:46 +0100
commita4d579a092054ba04052bb660a7caf1d8a31fe4c (patch)
tree2c4b798cfcda7d13f089bcb51e9d21090100d43f /net
parentf8838b48efe5a690b68eca4634b01f03e04560b4 (diff)
netfilter: x_tables: check for size overflow
Ben Hawkes says: integer overflow in xt_alloc_table_info, which on 32-bit systems can lead to small structure allocation and a copy_from_user based heap corruption. Change-Id: I13c554c630651a37e3f6a195e9a5f40cddcb29a1 Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r--net/netfilter/x_tables.c4
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
index 76909ac11..155b7f994 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
@@ -916,6 +916,10 @@ struct xt_table_info *xt_alloc_table_info(unsigned int size)
{
struct xt_table_info *newinfo;
int cpu;
+ size_t sz = sizeof(*newinfo) + size;
+
+ if (sz < sizeof(*newinfo))
+ return NULL;
/* Pedantry: prevent them from hitting BUG() in vmalloc.c --RR */
if ((SMP_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 2 > totalram_pages)