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authorEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>2019-06-15 17:40:56 -0700
committerMoyster <oysterized@gmail.com>2019-07-18 20:55:53 +0200
commitdbe995793b5daebd2a587a78c3278cea5f3cf627 (patch)
tree6ac0528664d48cbe768700013617a8008361ee84 /include/linux/semaphore.h
parent407c65e83249eca541964df9f84f0cd800f91f0e (diff)
tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits
commit f070ef2ac66716357066b683fb0baf55f8191a2e upstream. Jonathan Looney reported that a malicious peer can force a sender to fragment its retransmit queue into tiny skbs, inflating memory usage and/or overflow 32bit counters. TCP allows an application to queue up to sk_sndbuf bytes, so we need to give some allowance for non malicious splitting of retransmit queue. A new SNMP counter is added to monitor how many times TCP did not allow to split an skb if the allowance was exceeded. Note that this counter might increase in the case applications use SO_SNDBUF socket option to lower sk_sndbuf. CVE-2019-11478 : tcp_fragment, prevent fragmenting a packet when the socket is already using more than half the allowed space Change-Id: I594a9f68263f774fa6f0824042bc287bba6dc927 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com> Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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