diff options
| author | Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com> | 2015-02-23 11:17:13 -0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Moyster <oysterized@gmail.com> | 2016-11-17 12:11:48 +0100 |
| commit | 7e0a1af9c94a7d83f4094a2eda2d28d9e91eb9ca (patch) | |
| tree | 21a1acdae892a439f3ca4c8d84b1d2ec4cfc0694 /include/linux/file.h | |
| parent | 7db68b2c5dec2ad770e578bc279e73166e1b08e0 (diff) | |
ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Change-Id: I2a10453ba3ef7709bf8f943ac85bd44368c23311
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/file.h')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions