diff options
| author | fire855 <thefire855@gmail.com> | 2017-02-12 01:40:33 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mister Oyster <oysterized@gmail.com> | 2017-04-11 10:59:44 +0200 |
| commit | 649cd86e99ffa107d481b8f7c4bb8219068f964a (patch) | |
| tree | fb587a2bd05f72775f74bb6049ec5905af4b9f6d /fs/proc/array.c | |
| parent | 28989791c0bcbdc6b1d99b360f4e44b3dc3dba48 (diff) | |
Fix "Elevation of privilege vulnerability in kernel file system"
CVE-2017-0427
An elevation of privilege vulnerability in the kernel file system could enable a local malicious application to execute arbitrary code within the context of the kernel. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of a local permanent device compromise, which may require reflashing the operating system to repair the device.
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc/array.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/array.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index 8320f87a9..889b80915 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -168,16 +168,16 @@ static inline void task_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, int g; struct fdtable *fdt = NULL; const struct cred *cred; - pid_t ppid, tpid; + pid_t ppid = 0, tpid = 0; + struct task_struct *leader = NULL; rcu_read_lock(); - ppid = pid_alive(p) ? - task_tgid_nr_ns(rcu_dereference(p->real_parent), ns) : 0; - tpid = 0; if (pid_alive(p)) { struct task_struct *tracer = ptrace_parent(p); if (tracer) tpid = task_pid_nr_ns(tracer, ns); + ppid = task_tgid_nr_ns(rcu_dereference(p->real_parent), ns); + leader = p->group_leader; } cred = get_task_cred(p); seq_printf(m, @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static inline void task_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, "Uid:\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\n" "Gid:\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\n", get_task_state(p), - task_tgid_nr_ns(p, ns), + leader ? task_pid_nr_ns(leader, ns) : 0, pid_nr_ns(pid, ns), ppid, tpid, from_kuid_munged(user_ns, cred->uid), |