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| author | Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> | 2018-12-10 12:41:24 -0600 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Moyster <oysterized@gmail.com> | 2019-05-02 16:03:18 +0200 |
| commit | 30f4038178c85646c222e4160282413dc0116364 (patch) | |
| tree | 40562597c418df40999bad3921ccdc723d9a3732 /fs/debugfs | |
| parent | 19b83756898133e18853ca5c01ad69130dac4907 (diff) | |
ipv4: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
[ Upstream commit 5648451e30a0d13d11796574919a359025d52cce ]
vr.vifi is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1616 ipmr_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap)
net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1690 ipmr_compat_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing vr.vifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table'
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Change-Id: I24d37ed62547451a12b9764119122fb6f97aa549
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/debugfs')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions