diff options
| author | Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl> | 2017-06-03 09:35:06 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mister Oyster <oysterized@gmail.com> | 2017-08-31 01:38:20 +0200 |
| commit | 248eda7263b8f0646f9fb75352cc4df698b5b11f (patch) | |
| tree | e912c078730baf995118cee853417e1248410aad /drivers/tty | |
| parent | 21a721e90cc8b715822866de66a47d3310c40ba1 (diff) | |
vt: fix unchecked __put_user() in tioclinux ioctls
Only read access is checked before this call.
Actually, at the moment this is not an issue, as every in-tree arch does
the same manual checks for VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE, relying on the MMU
to tell them apart, but this wasn't the case in the past and may happen
again on some odd arch in the future.
If anyone cares about 3.7 and earlier, this is a security hole (untested)
on real 80386 CPUs.
Signed-off-by: Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.7-
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/tty')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c index 010ec70d5..3390a39f5 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c @@ -2601,13 +2601,13 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg) * related to the kernel should not use this. */ data = vt_get_shift_state(); - ret = __put_user(data, p); + ret = put_user(data, p); break; case TIOCL_GETMOUSEREPORTING: console_lock(); /* May be overkill */ data = mouse_reporting(); console_unlock(); - ret = __put_user(data, p); + ret = put_user(data, p); break; case TIOCL_SETVESABLANK: console_lock(); @@ -2616,7 +2616,7 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg) break; case TIOCL_GETKMSGREDIRECT: data = vt_get_kmsg_redirect(); - ret = __put_user(data, p); + ret = put_user(data, p); break; case TIOCL_SETKMSGREDIRECT: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { |