diff options
| author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2017-06-23 15:08:57 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mister Oyster <oysterized@gmail.com> | 2017-07-04 12:21:16 +0200 |
| commit | 049e693d00dda22b90b346dfde374bbdf87db460 (patch) | |
| tree | 170706d978b54673966f80bc270aaa15408d8906 /arch | |
| parent | 750aa014f192e2cc54674cfea657024ec6f95b46 (diff) | |
fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers
commit 98da7d08850fb8bdeb395d6368ed15753304aa0c upstream.
When limiting the argv/envp strings during exec to 1/4 of the stack limit,
the storage of the pointers to the strings was not included. This means
that an exec with huge numbers of tiny strings could eat 1/4 of the stack
limit in strings and then additional space would be later used by the
pointers to the strings.
For example, on 32-bit with a 8MB stack rlimit, an exec with 1677721
single-byte strings would consume less than 2MB of stack, the max (8MB /
4) amount allowed, but the pointers to the strings would consume the
remaining additional stack space (1677721 * 4 == 6710884).
The result (1677721 + 6710884 == 8388605) would exhaust stack space
entirely. Controlling this stack exhaustion could result in
pathological behavior in setuid binaries (CVE-2017-1000365).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: additional commenting from Kees]
Fixes: b6a2fea39318 ("mm: variable length argument support")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622001720.GA32173@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: I2e01d7be2d52415264ff48c632bfe307008c4e03
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
