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| author | Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> | 2015-12-31 10:28:52 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mister Oyster <oysterized@gmail.com> | 2017-04-13 12:32:43 +0200 |
| commit | d6af47809481603df3a4be463504b2d18c3c1e93 (patch) | |
| tree | 711d4d1786c7a00964a3737293af5d1f3eeae570 | |
| parent | abdbb4035cd99f4d7a95b596b5b7f89cfdbc351b (diff) | |
| download | android_kernel_m2note-d6af47809481603df3a4be463504b2d18c3c1e93.tar.gz | |
f2fs: remove f2fs_bug_on in terms of max_depth
There is no report on this bug_on case, but if malicious attacker changed this
field intentionally, we can just reset it as a MAX value.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/f2fs/dir.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/dir.c b/fs/f2fs/dir.c index d5447fda0..7cb90ce23 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/dir.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/dir.c @@ -174,8 +174,6 @@ static struct f2fs_dir_entry *find_in_level(struct inode *dir, namehash = f2fs_dentry_hash(&name); - f2fs_bug_on(F2FS_I_SB(dir), level > MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH); - nbucket = dir_buckets(level, F2FS_I(dir)->i_dir_level); nblock = bucket_blocks(level); @@ -240,6 +238,14 @@ struct f2fs_dir_entry *f2fs_find_entry(struct inode *dir, struct qstr *child, goto out; max_depth = F2FS_I(dir)->i_current_depth; + if (unlikely(max_depth > MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH)) { + f2fs_msg(F2FS_I_SB(dir)->sb, KERN_WARNING, + "Corrupted max_depth of %lu: %u", + dir->i_ino, max_depth); + max_depth = MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH; + F2FS_I(dir)->i_current_depth = max_depth; + mark_inode_dirty(dir); + } for (level = 0; level < max_depth; level++) { de = find_in_level(dir, level, &fname, res_page); |