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* Bump libwebXavier Del Campo Romero2026-02-131-2/+21
| | | | | | | libweb has introduced several breaking changes: - Add optional expiration date to http_cookie_create - Replace Makefile with configure script
* Replace OpenSSL with libsodium and argon2idXavier Del Campo Romero2025-10-081-23/+72
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The SHA256-based password hashing algorithm used by slcl(1) and usergen(1) is considered insecure against several kinds of attacks, including brute force attacks. [1] Therefore, a stronger password hashing algorithm based on the Argon2id key derivation function is now used by default. While OpenSSL does support Argon2id, it is only supported by very recent versions [2], which are still not packaged by most distributions as of the time of this writing. [3] As an alternative to OpenSSL, libsodium [4] had several benefits: - It provides easy-to-use functions for password hashing, base64 encoding/decoding and other cryptographic primitives used by slcl(1) and usergen(1). - It is packaged by most distributions [5], and most often only the patch version differs, which ensures good compatibility across distributions. Unfortunately, and as opposed to OpenSSL, libsodium does not come with command-line tools. Therefore, usergen(1) had to be rewritten in C. In order to maintain backwards compatiblity with existing databases, slcl(1) and usergen(1) shall support the insecure, SHA256-based password hashing algorithm. However, Argon2id shall now be the default choice for usergen(1). [1]: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/195563/why-is-sha-256-not-good-for-passwords [2]: https://docs.openssl.org/3.3/man7/EVP_KDF-ARGON2/ [3]: https://repology.org/project/openssl/versions [4]: https://www.libsodium.org/ [5]: https://repology.org/project/libsodium/versions
* Fix wrong function names on failureXavier Del Campo Romero2025-10-021-1/+1
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* auth.c: Remove unused argumentsXavier Del Campo Romero2025-10-021-3/+3
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* auth.c: Fix missing username checkXavier Del Campo Romero2025-10-021-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | So far, auth_login was looking for a key that matched the expected HMAC, among all registered users, and therefore without looking up the username from the cookie key. This allowed attackers to forge a cookie with a valid key but another username, and therefore see the contents from other users.
* auth.c: Make use of crealpathXavier Del Campo Romero2025-09-241-44/+4
| | | | | crealpath already provides a mechanism to determine the current working directory from getcwd(3).
* auth.c: Replace sprintf(3) with snprintf(3)Xavier Del Campo Romero2024-08-211-1/+12
| | | | | | Even if this specific use of sprintf(3) was safe because sizeof sha256_str > (sizeof sha256 * 2), some implementations would consider sprintf(3) unsafe anyway.
* auth.c: Reject empty filesXavier Del Campo Romero2024-06-131-0/+5
| | | | | | It makes no sense to attempt to fopen(3) an empty file and malloc(3) zero bytes so as to dump it, as dump_db is still meant to fail on empty files.
* auth.c: Fix potential signed integer overflowXavier Del Campo Romero2023-10-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | For platforms where int is a 16-bit data type, this operation might overflow and possibly cause either unexpected behaviour and/or a compiler warning. Therefore, it is safer to promote each integer constant accordingly.
* Apply slweb renaming to libwebXavier Del Campo Romero2023-10-111-1/+1
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* auth.c: Add missing includeXavier Del Campo Romero2023-09-151-0/+1
| | | | | As opposed to other integer constants such as ULLONG_MAX, SIZE_MAX is defined by stdint.h, not limits.h.
* Adapt to slweb's include pathsXavier Del Campo Romero2023-07-211-1/+1
| | | | | slweb puts its header files into its own directory in order to avoid potential name clashing.
* auth.c: Fix wrong size checkXavier Del Campo Romero2023-05-281-1/+1
| | | | Otherwise, sb.st_size + 1 would exceed SIZE_MAX.
* auth.c: Ensure absolute path for a->dirXavier Del Campo Romero2023-03-251-13/+64
| | | | | Otherwise, slcl would create broken symbolic links if the user passes a relative path as command line argument.
* auth.c: Add friendly reminderXavier Del Campo Romero2023-03-161-1/+2
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* Move decode_hex into its own fileXavier Del Campo Romero2023-03-091-22/+7
| | | | | | | - Error detection against strotul(3) has been improved, as done in other places. - New function encode_hex has been implemented, which will be used by future commits.
* Perform some minor optimizationsXavier Del Campo Romero2023-03-061-1/+1
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* Implement user quotaXavier Del Campo Romero2023-03-061-0/+91
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This feature allows admins to set a specific quota for each user, in MiB. This feature is particularly useful for shared instances, where unlimited user storage might be unfeasible or even dangerous for the server. Also, a nice HTML5 <progress> element has been added to the site that shows how much of the quota has been consumed. If no quota is set, slcl falls back to the default behaviour i.e., assume unlimited storage. Limitations: - While HTTP does specify a Content-Length, which determines the length of the whole request, it does not specify how many files are involved or their individual sizes. - Because of this, if multiple files are uploaded simultaneously, the whole request would be dropped if user quota is exceeded, even if not all files exceeded it. - Also, Content-Length adds the length of some HTTP boilerplate (e.g.: boundaries), but slcl must rely on this before accepting the whole request. In other words, this means some requests might be rejected by slcl because of the extra bytes caused by such boilerplate. - When the quota is exceeded, slcl must close the connection so that the rest of the transfer is cancelled. Unfortunately, this means no HTML can be sent back to the customer to inform about the situation.
* Initial commitXavier Del Campo Romero2023-02-281-0/+472
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