| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| * | UPSTREAM: seccomp: always propagate NO_NEW_PRIVS on tsync | Jann Horn | 2017-04-13 | 1 | -11/+11 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Before this patch, a process with some permissive seccomp filter that was applied by root without NO_NEW_PRIVS was able to add more filters to itself without setting NO_NEW_PRIVS by setting the new filter from a throwaway thread with NO_NEW_PRIVS. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Bug: 36656103 (cherry-picked from commit 103502a35cfce0710909da874f092cb44823ca03) Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com> Change-Id: I5abd7daab9172f1dfd53e11706b7c7f331f2f4f1 | ||||
| * | UPSTREAM: seccomp: cap SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO data to MAX_ERRNO | Kees Cook | 2017-04-11 | 1 | -1/+3 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The value resulting from the SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask could exceed MAX_ERRNO when setting errno during a SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO filter action. This makes sure we have a reliable value being set, so that an invalid errno will not be ignored by userspace. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 580c57f1076872ebc2427f898b927944ce170f2d) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Change-Id: If82aa1b5f4be6375e8ca301d317d3d2db88a66dd | ||||
| * | first commit | Meizu OpenSource | 2016-08-15 | 1 | -0/+814 |
