| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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commit 2cf750704bb6d7ed8c7d732e071dd1bc890ea5e8 upstream.
Since the commit below the ipmr/ip6mr rtnl_unicast() code uses the portid
instead of the previous dst_pid which was copied from in_skb's portid.
Since the skb is new the portid is 0 at that point so the packets are sent
to the kernel and we get scheduling while atomic or a deadlock (depending
on where it happens) by trying to acquire rtnl two times.
Also since this is RTM_GETROUTE, it can be triggered by a normal user.
Here's the sleeping while atomic trace:
[ 7858.212557] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:620
[ 7858.212748] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/0
[ 7858.212881] 2 locks held by swapper/0/0:
[ 7858.213013] #0: (((&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer))){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff810fbbf5>] call_timer_fn+0x5/0x350
[ 7858.213422] #1: (mfc_unres_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff8161e005>] ipmr_expire_process+0x25/0x130
[ 7858.213807] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc7+ #179
[ 7858.213934] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140531_083030-gandalf 04/01/2014
[ 7858.214108] 0000000000000000 ffff88005b403c50 ffffffff813a7804 0000000000000000
[ 7858.214412] ffffffff81a1338e ffff88005b403c78 ffffffff810a4a72 ffffffff81a1338e
[ 7858.214716] 000000000000026c 0000000000000000 ffff88005b403ca8 ffffffff810a4b9f
[ 7858.215251] Call Trace:
[ 7858.215412] <IRQ> [<ffffffff813a7804>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc1
[ 7858.215662] [<ffffffff810a4a72>] ___might_sleep+0x192/0x250
[ 7858.215868] [<ffffffff810a4b9f>] __might_sleep+0x6f/0x100
[ 7858.216072] [<ffffffff8165bea3>] mutex_lock_nested+0x33/0x4d0
[ 7858.216279] [<ffffffff815a7a5f>] ? netlink_lookup+0x25f/0x460
[ 7858.216487] [<ffffffff8157474b>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x1b/0x40
[ 7858.216687] [<ffffffff815a9a0c>] netlink_unicast+0x19c/0x260
[ 7858.216900] [<ffffffff81573c70>] rtnl_unicast+0x20/0x30
[ 7858.217128] [<ffffffff8161cd39>] ipmr_destroy_unres+0xa9/0xf0
[ 7858.217351] [<ffffffff8161e06f>] ipmr_expire_process+0x8f/0x130
[ 7858.217581] [<ffffffff8161dfe0>] ? ipmr_net_init+0x180/0x180
[ 7858.217785] [<ffffffff8161dfe0>] ? ipmr_net_init+0x180/0x180
[ 7858.217990] [<ffffffff810fbc95>] call_timer_fn+0xa5/0x350
[ 7858.218192] [<ffffffff810fbbf5>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x350
[ 7858.218415] [<ffffffff8161dfe0>] ? ipmr_net_init+0x180/0x180
[ 7858.218656] [<ffffffff810fde10>] run_timer_softirq+0x260/0x640
[ 7858.218865] [<ffffffff8166379b>] ? __do_softirq+0xbb/0x54f
[ 7858.219068] [<ffffffff816637c8>] __do_softirq+0xe8/0x54f
[ 7858.219269] [<ffffffff8107a948>] irq_exit+0xb8/0xc0
[ 7858.219463] [<ffffffff81663452>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x42/0x50
[ 7858.219678] [<ffffffff816625bc>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xa0
[ 7858.219897] <EOI> [<ffffffff81055f16>] ? native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10
[ 7858.220165] [<ffffffff810d64dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 7858.220373] [<ffffffff810298e3>] default_idle+0x23/0x190
[ 7858.220574] [<ffffffff8102a20f>] arch_cpu_idle+0xf/0x20
[ 7858.220790] [<ffffffff810c9f8c>] default_idle_call+0x4c/0x60
[ 7858.221016] [<ffffffff810ca33b>] cpu_startup_entry+0x39b/0x4d0
[ 7858.221257] [<ffffffff8164f995>] rest_init+0x135/0x140
[ 7858.221469] [<ffffffff81f83014>] start_kernel+0x50e/0x51b
[ 7858.221670] [<ffffffff81f82120>] ? early_idt_handler_array+0x120/0x120
[ 7858.221894] [<ffffffff81f8243f>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c
[ 7858.222113] [<ffffffff81f8257c>] x86_64_start_kernel+0x13b/0x14a
Fixes: 2942e9005056 ("[RTNETLINK]: Use rtnl_unicast() for rtnetlink unicasts")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 24b27fc4cdf9e10c5e79e5923b6b7c2c5c95096c upstream.
Following few steps will crash kernel -
(a) Create bonding master
> modprobe bonding miimon=50
(b) Create macvlan bridge on eth2
> ip link add link eth2 dev mvl0 address aa:0:0:0:0:01 \
type macvlan
(c) Now try adding eth2 into the bond
> echo +eth2 > /sys/class/net/bond0/bonding/slaves
<crash>
Bonding does lots of things before checking if the device enslaved is
busy or not.
In this case when the notifier call-chain sends notifications, the
bond_netdev_event() assumes that the rx_handler /rx_handler_data is
registered while the bond_enslave() hasn't progressed far enough to
register rx_handler for the new slave.
This patch adds a rx_handler check that can be performed right at the
beginning of the enslave code to avoid getting into this situation.
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit ac6e780070e30e4c35bd395acfe9191e6268bdd3 upstream.
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 8c7fbe5795a016259445a61e072eb0118aaf6a61 upstream.
Commit 3876488444e7 ("include/stddef.h: Move offsetofend() from vfio.h
to a generic kernel header") added offsetofend outside the normal
include #ifndef/#endif guard. Move it inside.
Miscellanea:
o remove unnecessary blank line
o standardize offsetof macros whitespace style
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[wt: backported only for ipv6 out-of-bounds fix]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 3876488444e71238e287459c39d7692b6f718c3e upstream.
Suggested by Andy.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1425912738-559-1-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[wt: backported only for ipv6 out-of-bounds fix]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit b13460b92093b29347e99d6c3242e350052b62cd upstream.
The macro offsetofend() introduces unnecessary temporary variable
"tmp". The patch avoids that and saves a bit memory in stack.
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
[wt: backported only for ipv6 out-of-bounds fix]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit c3c87e770458aa004bd7ed3f29945ff436fd6511 upstream.
The fix from 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during
moving group") was incomplete in that it failed to recognise that
creating a group with events for different CPUs is semantically
broken -- they cannot be co-scheduled.
Furthermore, it leads to real breakage where, when we create an event
for CPU Y and then migrate it to form a group on CPU X, the code gets
confused where the counter is programmed -- triggered in practice
as well by me via the perf fuzzer.
Fix this by tightening the rules for creating groups. Only allow
grouping of counters that can be co-scheduled in the same context.
This means for the same task and/or the same cpu.
Fixes: 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during moving group")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.090683288@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 4097461897df91041382ff6fcd2bfa7ee6b2448c upstream.
As explained in 1407814240-4275-1-git-send-email-decui@microsoft.com we
have a hard load dependency between i8042 and atkbd which prevents
keyboard from working on Gen2 Hyper-V VMs.
> hyperv_keyboard invokes serio_interrupt(), which needs a valid serio
> driver like atkbd.c. atkbd.c depends on libps2.c because it invokes
> ps2_command(). libps2.c depends on i8042.c because it invokes
> i8042_check_port_owner(). As a result, hyperv_keyboard actually
> depends on i8042.c.
>
> For a Generation 2 Hyper-V VM (meaning no i8042 device emulated), if a
> Linux VM (like Arch Linux) happens to configure CONFIG_SERIO_I8042=m
> rather than =y, atkbd.ko can't load because i8042.ko can't load(due to
> no i8042 device emulated) and finally hyperv_keyboard can't work and
> the user can't input: https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/39820
> (Ubuntu/RHEL/SUSE aren't affected since they use CONFIG_SERIO_I8042=y)
To break the dependency we move away from using i8042_check_port_owner()
and instead allow serio port owner specify a mutex that clients should use
to serialize PS/2 command stream.
Reported-by: Mark Laws <mdl@60hz.org>
Tested-by: Mark Laws <mdl@60hz.org>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit e23d4159b109167126e5bcd7f3775c95de7fee47 upstream.
Switching iov_iter fault-in to multipages variants has exposed an old
bug in underlying fault_in_multipages_...(); they break if the range
passed to them wraps around. Normally access_ok() done by callers will
prevent such (and it's a guaranteed EFAULT - ERR_PTR() values fall into
such a range and they should not point to any valid objects).
However, on architectures where userland and kernel live in different
MMU contexts (e.g. s390) access_ok() is a no-op and on those a range
with a wraparound can reach fault_in_multipages_...().
Since any wraparound means EFAULT there, the fix is trivial - turn
those
while (uaddr <= end)
...
into
if (unlikely(uaddr > end))
return -EFAULT;
do
...
while (uaddr <= end);
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Currently CONFIG_TIMER_STATS exposes process information across namespaces:
kernel/time/timer_list.c print_timer():
SEQ_printf(m, ", %s/%d", tmp, timer->start_pid);
/proc/timer_list:
#11: <0000000000000000>, hrtimer_wakeup, S:01, do_nanosleep, cron/2570
Given that the tracer can give the same information, this patch entirely
removes CONFIG_TIMER_STATS.
Change-Id: Ice26d74094d3ad563808342c1604ad444234844b
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Xing Gao <xgao01@email.wm.edu>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jessica Frazelle <me@jessfraz.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170208192659.GA32582@beast
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[tsoni@codeaurora.org: trivial merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: David Keitel <dkeitel@codeaurora.org>
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To be able to use the hex ascii functions in case sensitive environments
the array hex_asc_upper[] and the needed functions for hex_byte_pack_upper()
are introduced.
Signed-off-by: Andre Naujoks <nautsch2@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Cleanup unused `if 0'-ed functions, which have been dead since 2006
(commits 87c2ce3b9305 ("lib/zlib*: cleanups") by Adrian Bunk and
4f3865fb57a0 ("zlib_inflate: Upgrade library code to a recent version")
by Richard Purdie):
- zlib_deflateSetDictionary
- zlib_deflateParams
- zlib_deflateCopy
- zlib_inflateSync
- zlib_syncsearch
- zlib_inflateSetDictionary
- zlib_inflatePrime
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This eliminates a 1-bit left shift in every single caller,
and makes the inner loop of the CRC computation more efficient.
Renamed crc7 to crc7_be (big-endian) since the interface changed.
Also purged #include <linux/crc7.h> from files that don't use it at all.
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
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In case they help the compiler.
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There's no need for a full 32x32 matrix, when rows before the last are
just shifted copies of the rows after them.
There's still room for improvement (especially on X86 processors with
CRC32 and PCLMUL instructions), but this is a large step in the
right direction [which is in particular useful for its current user,
namely SCTP checksumming over multiple skb frags[] entries, i.e. in
IPVS balancing when other CRC32 offloads are not available].
The internal primitive is now called crc32_generic_shift and takes one
less argument; the XOR with crc2 is done in inline wrappers.
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch adds a combinator to merge two or more crc32{,c}s
into a new one. This is useful for checksum computations of
fragmented skbs that use crc32/crc32c as checksums.
The arithmetics for combining both in the GF(2) was taken and
slightly modified from zlib. Only passing two crcs is insufficient
as two crcs and the length of the second piece is needed for
merging. The code is made generic, so that only polynomials
need to be passed for crc32_le resp. crc32c_le.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Joe Maples <joe@frap129.org>
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Signed-off-by: Joe Maples <joe@frap129.org>
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This adds the capability for a process that has CAP_NET_ADMIN on
a socket to see the socket mark in socket dumps.
Commit a52e95abf772 ("net: diag: allow socket bytecode filters to
match socket marks") recently gave privileged processes the
ability to filter socket dumps based on mark. This patch is
complementary: it ensures that the mark is also passed to
userspace in the socket's netlink attributes. It is useful for
tools like ss which display information about sockets.
[backport of net-next d545caca827b65aab557a9e9dcdcf1e5a3823c2d]
Change-Id: I0c9708aae5ab8dfa296b8a1e6aecceb2a382415a
Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/270210
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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We've switched over every architecture that supports SMP to it, so
remove the new useless config variable.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[imaund@codeaurora.org: resolve merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Ian Maund <imaund@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
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(cherry picked from commit 06af1c52c9ea234e0b1266cc0b52c3e0c6c8fe9f)
The current lz4 compress buffer is 16kb on 32-bits, 32kb on 64-bits
system. But, lz4 needs only 16kb on both. On 64-bits, this causes
wasted cpu cycles for additional memset during every compression.
In case of lz4hc, the current buffer size is (256kb + 8) on 32-bits,
(512kb + 16) on 64-bits. But, lz4hc needs only (256kb + 2 * pointer) on
both.
This patch fixes these wrong compress buffer sizes for 64-bits.
Signed-off-by: Bongkyu Kim <bongkyu.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Chanho Min <chanho.min@lge.com>
Cc: Yann Collet <yann.collet.73@gmail.com>
Cc: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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lz4 is significantly faster than lzo, which makes it ideal for zram.
decompressor: add LZ4 decompressor module
Add support for LZ4 decompression in the Linux Kernel. LZ4 Decompression
APIs for kernel are based on LZ4 implementation by Yann Collet.
Benchmark Results(PATCH v3)
Compiler: Linaro ARM gcc 4.6.2
1. ARMv7, 1.5GHz based board
Kernel: linux 3.4
Uncompressed Kernel Size: 14MB
Compressed Size Decompression Speed
LZO 6.7MB 20.1MB/s, 25.2MB/s(UA)
LZ4 7.3MB 29.1MB/s, 45.6MB/s(UA)
2. ARMv7, 1.7GHz based board
Kernel: linux 3.7
Uncompressed Kernel Size: 14MB
Compressed Size Decompression Speed
LZO 6.0MB 34.1MB/s, 52.2MB/s(UA)
LZ4 6.5MB 86.7MB/s
- UA: Unaligned memory Access support
- Latest patch set for LZO applied
This patch set is for adding support for LZ4-compressed Kernel. LZ4 is a
very fast lossless compression algorithm and it also features an extremely
fast decoder [1].
But we have five of decompressors already and one question which does
arise, however, is that of where do we stop adding new ones? This issue
had been discussed and came to the conclusion [2].
Russell King said that we should have:
- one decompressor which is the fastest
- one decompressor for the highest compression ratio
- one popular decompressor (eg conventional gzip)
If we have a replacement one for one of these, then it should do exactly
that: replace it.
The benchmark shows that an 8% increase in image size vs a 66% increase
in decompression speed compared to LZO(which has been known as the
fastest decompressor in the Kernel). Therefore the "fast but may not be
small" compression title has clearly been taken by LZ4 [3].
[1] http://code.google.com/p/lz4/
[2] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kbuild.devel/9157
[3] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kbuild.devel/9347
LZ4 homepage: http://fastcompression.blogspot.com/p/lz4.html
LZ4 source repository: http://code.google.com/p/lz4/
Signed-off-by: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann Collet <yann.collet.73@gmail.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Florian Fainelli <florian@openwrt.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit cffb78b0e0b3a30b059b27a1d97500cf6464efa9)
Change-Id: I75ab38092ec016a22d0e5f09fcd60ce83a24c947
lib: add lz4 compressor module
This patchset is for supporting LZ4 compression and the crypto API using
it.
As shown below, the size of data is a little bit bigger but compressing
speed is faster under the enabled unaligned memory access. We can use
lz4 de/compression through crypto API as well. Also, It will be useful
for another potential user of lz4 compression.
lz4 Compression Benchmark:
Compiler: ARM gcc 4.6.4
ARMv7, 1 GHz based board
Kernel: linux 3.4
Uncompressed data Size: 101 MB
Compressed Size compression Speed
LZO 72.1MB 32.1MB/s, 33.0MB/s(UA)
LZ4 75.1MB 30.4MB/s, 35.9MB/s(UA)
LZ4HC 59.8MB 2.4MB/s, 2.5MB/s(UA)
- UA: Unaligned memory Access support
- Latest patch set for LZO applied
This patch:
Add support for LZ4 compression in the Linux Kernel. LZ4 Compression APIs
for kernel are based on LZ4 implementation by Yann Collet and were changed
for kernel coding style.
LZ4 homepage : http://fastcompression.blogspot.com/p/lz4.html
LZ4 source repository : http://code.google.com/p/lz4/
svn revision : r90
Two APIs are added:
lz4_compress() support basic lz4 compression whereas lz4hc_compress()
support high compression or CPU performance get lower but compression
ratio get higher. Also, we require the pre-allocated working memory with
the defined size and destination buffer must be allocated with the size of
lz4_compressbound.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make lz4_compresshcctx() static]
Signed-off-by: Chanho Min <chanho.min@lge.com>
Cc: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Bob Pearson <rpearson@systemfabricworks.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.hengli.com.au>
Cc: Yann Collet <yann.collet.73@gmail.com>
Cc: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit c72ac7a1a926dbffb59daf0f275450e5eecce16f)
lib: add support for LZ4-compressed kernel
Add support for extracting LZ4-compressed kernel images, as well as
LZ4-compressed ramdisk images in the kernel boot process.
Signed-off-by: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Florian Fainelli <florian@openwrt.org>
Cc: Yann Collet <yann.collet.73@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit e76e1fdfa8f8dc1ea6699923cf5d92b5bee9c936)
Change-Id: I280ccb95d3399c2e3ed529e60ae3c53190337bea
lib/lz4: correct the LZ4 license
The LZ4 code is listed as using the "BSD 2-Clause License".
Signed-off-by: Richard Laager <rlaager@wiktel.com>
Acked-by: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com>
Cc: Chanho Min <chanho.min@lge.com>
Cc: Richard Yao <ryao@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
[ The 2-clause BSD can be just converted into GPL, but that's rude and
pointless, so don't do it - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit ee8a99bdb47f32327bdfaffe35b900ca7161ba4e)
lz4: fix compression/decompression signedness mismatch
LZ4 compression and decompression functions require different in
signedness input/output parameters: unsigned char for compression and
signed char for decompression.
Change decompression API to require "(const) unsigned char *".
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Yann Collet <yann.collet.73@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit b34081f1cd59585451efaa69e1dff1b9507e6c89)
lz4: ensure length does not wrap
Given some pathologically compressed data, lz4 could possibly decide to
wrap a few internal variables, causing unknown things to happen. Catch
this before the wrapping happens and abort the decompression.
Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" <donb@securitymouse.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 206204a1162b995e2185275167b22468c00d6b36)
lz4: fix another possible overrun
There is one other possible overrun in the lz4 code as implemented by
Linux at this point in time (which differs from the upstream lz4
codebase, but will get synced at in a future kernel release.) As
pointed out by Don, we also need to check the overflow in the data
itself.
While we are at it, replace the odd error return value with just a
"simple" -1 value as the return value is never used for anything other
than a basic "did this work or not" check.
Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" <donb@securitymouse.com>
Reported-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4148c1f67abf823099b2d7db6851e4aea407f5ee)
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[Detail] implement Adaptive KSM
[Solution] implement Adaptive KSM
[Feature] Adaptive KSM
MTK-Commit-Id: 39cab34ba6273f932a61698513284383dc6bb3bc
Change-Id: I844434ef2d1159fea0f0c265d05a0e118cf618f6
Signed-off-by: Casper Li <casper.li@mediatek.com>
CR-Id: ALPS02298405
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MTK extension MTK_DHCPV6C_WIFI is no longer necessary. Remove option
and functionality.
This reverts commit ccd52552b0ef ("HPV6: fix HPv6 onfig Error") and
4996bbf5c24b ("DHCPV6:Support DHCPV6 to Assign IPV6 Address")
Change-Id: I3a1ea546bd4006546a301e0fc0fed721ae5c507f
CR-Id: ALPS02210363
Signed-off-by: Yingjoe Chen <yingjoe.chen@mediatek.com>
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[ Upstream commit 45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39 ]
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
BUG: 28746669
Change-Id: I207da29ac48bb6dd7c40d65f9e27c4e3ff508da0
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Pierre Imai <imaipi@google.com>
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Add and document `comp_algorithm' device attribute. This attribute allows
to show supported compression and currently selected compression
algorithms:
cat /sys/block/zram0/comp_algorithm
[lzo] lz4
and change selected compression algorithm:
echo lzo > /sys/block/zram0/comp_algorithm
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Existing zram (zcomp) implementation has only one compression stream
(buffer and algorithm private part), so in order to prevent data
corruption only one write (compress operation) can use this compression
stream, forcing all concurrent write operations to wait for stream lock
to be released. This patch changes zcomp to keep a compression streams
list of user-defined size (via sysfs device attr). Each write operation
still exclusively holds compression stream, the difference is that we
can have N write operations (depending on size of streams list)
executing in parallel. See TEST section later in commit message for
performance data.
Introduce struct zcomp_strm_multi and a set of functions to manage
zcomp_strm stream access. zcomp_strm_multi has a list of idle
zcomp_strm structs, spinlock to protect idle list and wait queue, making
it possible to perform parallel compressions.
The following set of functions added:
- zcomp_strm_multi_find()/zcomp_strm_multi_release()
find and release a compression stream, implement required locking
- zcomp_strm_multi_create()/zcomp_strm_multi_destroy()
create and destroy zcomp_strm_multi
zcomp ->strm_find() and ->strm_release() callbacks are set during
initialisation to zcomp_strm_multi_find()/zcomp_strm_multi_release()
correspondingly.
Each time zcomp issues a zcomp_strm_multi_find() call, the following set
of operations performed:
- spin lock strm_lock
- if idle list is not empty, remove zcomp_strm from idle list, spin
unlock and return zcomp stream pointer to caller
- if idle list is empty, current adds itself to wait queue. it will be
awaken by zcomp_strm_multi_release() caller.
zcomp_strm_multi_release():
- spin lock strm_lock
- add zcomp stream to idle list
- spin unlock, wake up sleeper
Minchan Kim reported that spinlock-based locking scheme has demonstrated
a severe perfomance regression for single compression stream case,
comparing to mutex-based (see https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/2/18/16)
base spinlock mutex
==Initial write ==Initial write ==Initial write
records: 5 records: 5 records: 5
avg: 1642424.35 avg: 699610.40 avg: 1655583.71
std: 39890.95(2.43%) std: 232014.19(33.16%) std: 52293.96
max: 1690170.94 max: 1163473.45 max: 1697164.75
min: 1568669.52 min: 573429.88 min: 1553410.23
==Rewrite ==Rewrite ==Rewrite
records: 5 records: 5 records: 5
avg: 1611775.39 avg: 501406.64 avg: 1684419.11
std: 17144.58(1.06%) std: 15354.41(3.06%) std: 18367.42
max: 1641800.95 max: 531356.78 max: 1706445.84
min: 1593515.27 min: 488817.78 min: 1655335.73
When only one compression stream available, mutex with spin on owner
tends to perform much better than frequent wait_event()/wake_up(). This
is why single stream implemented as a special case with mutex locking.
Introduce and document zram device attribute max_comp_streams. This
attr shows and stores current zcomp's max number of zcomp streams
(max_strm). Extend zcomp's zcomp_create() with `max_strm' parameter.
`max_strm' limits the number of zcomp_strm structs in compression
backend's idle list (max_comp_streams).
max_comp_streams used during initialisation as follows:
-- passing to zcomp_create() max_strm equals to 1 will initialise zcomp
using single compression stream zcomp_strm_single (mutex-based locking).
-- passing to zcomp_create() max_strm greater than 1 will initialise zcomp
using multi compression stream zcomp_strm_multi (spinlock-based locking).
default max_comp_streams value is 1, meaning that zram with single stream
will be initialised.
Later patch will introduce configuration knob to change max_comp_streams
on already initialised and used zcomp.
TEST
iozone -t 3 -R -r 16K -s 60M -I +Z
test base 1 strm (mutex) 3 strm (spinlock)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial write 589286.78 583518.39 718011.05
Rewrite 604837.97 596776.38 1515125.72
Random write 584120.11 595714.58 1388850.25
Pwrite 535731.17 541117.38 739295.27
Fwrite 1418083.88 1478612.72 1484927.06
Usage example:
set max_comp_streams to 4
echo 4 > /sys/block/zram0/max_comp_streams
show current max_comp_streams (default value is 1).
cat /sys/block/zram0/max_comp_streams
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Conflicts:
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-block-zram
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Do not perform direct LZO compress/decompress calls, initialise
and use zcomp LZO backend (single compression stream) instead.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: resolve conflicts with zram-delete-zram_init_device-fix.patch]
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Conflicts:
drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c
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struct table `count' member is not used.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is a preparation patch for stats code duplication removal.
1) use atomic64_t for `pages_zero' and `pages_stored' zram stats.
2) `compr_size' and `pages_zero' struct zram_stats members did not
follow the existing device attr naming scheme: zram_stats.ATTR has
ATTR_show() function. rename them:
-- compr_size -> compr_data_size
-- pages_zero -> zero_pages
Minchan Kim's note:
If we really have trouble with atomic stat operation, we could
change it with percpu_counter so that it could solve atomic overhead and
unnecessary memory space by introducing unsigned long instead of 64bit
atomic_t.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Remove `good' and `bad' compressed sub-requests stats. RW request may
cause a number of RW sub-requests. zram used to account `good' compressed
sub-queries (with compressed size less than 50% of original size), `bad'
compressed sub-queries (with compressed size greater that 75% of original
size), leaving sub-requests with compression size between 50% and 75% of
original size not accounted and not reported. zram already accounts each
sub-request's compression size so we can calculate real device compression
ratio.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The following method of CPU hotplug callback registration is not safe
due to the possibility of an ABBA deadlock involving the cpu_add_remove_lock
and the cpu_hotplug.lock.
get_online_cpus();
for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
init_cpu(cpu);
register_cpu_notifier(&foobar_cpu_notifier);
put_online_cpus();
The deadlock is shown below:
CPU 0 CPU 1
----- -----
Acquire cpu_hotplug.lock
[via get_online_cpus()]
CPU online/offline operation
takes cpu_add_remove_lock
[via cpu_maps_update_begin()]
Try to acquire
cpu_add_remove_lock
[via register_cpu_notifier()]
CPU online/offline operation
tries to acquire cpu_hotplug.lock
[via cpu_hotplug_begin()]
*** DEADLOCK! ***
The problem here is that callback registration takes the locks in one order
whereas the CPU hotplug operations take the same locks in the opposite order.
To avoid this issue and to provide a race-free method to register CPU hotplug
callbacks (along with initialization of already online CPUs), introduce new
variants of the callback registration APIs that simply register the callbacks
without holding the cpu_add_remove_lock during the registration. That way,
we can avoid the ABBA scenario. However, we will need to hold the
cpu_add_remove_lock throughout the entire critical section, to protect updates
to the callback/notifier chain.
This can be achieved by writing the callback registration code as follows:
cpu_maps_update_begin(); [ or cpu_notifier_register_begin(); see below ]
for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
init_cpu(cpu);
/* This doesn't take the cpu_add_remove_lock */
__register_cpu_notifier(&foobar_cpu_notifier);
cpu_maps_update_done(); [ or cpu_notifier_register_done(); see below ]
Note that we can't use get_online_cpus() here instead of cpu_maps_update_begin()
because the cpu_hotplug.lock is dropped during the invocation of CPU_POST_DEAD
notifiers, and hence get_online_cpus() cannot provide the necessary
synchronization to protect the callback/notifier chains against concurrent
reads and writes. On the other hand, since the cpu_add_remove_lock protects
the entire hotplug operation (including CPU_POST_DEAD), we can use
cpu_maps_update_begin/done() to guarantee proper synchronization.
Also, since cpu_maps_update_begin/done() is like a super-set of
get/put_online_cpus(), the former naturally protects the critical sections
from concurrent hotplug operations.
Since the names cpu_maps_update_begin/done() don't make much sense in CPU
hotplug callback registration scenarios, we'll introduce new APIs named
cpu_notifier_register_begin/done() and map them to cpu_maps_update_begin/done().
In summary, introduce the lockless variants of un/register_cpu_notifier() and
also export the cpu_notifier_register_begin/done() APIs for use by modules.
This way, we provide a race-free way to register hotplug callbacks as well as
perform initialization for the CPUs that are already online.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Gautham R. Shenoy <ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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Introduce init_done() helper function which allows us to drop `init_done'
struct zram member. init_done() uses the fact that ->init_done == 1
equals to ->meta != NULL.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Finally, we separated zram->lock dependency from 32bit stat/ table
handling so there is no reason to use rw_semaphore between read and
write path so this patch removes the lock from read path totally and
changes rw_semaphore with mutex. So, we could do
old:
read-read: OK
read-write: NO
write-write: NO
Now:
read-read: OK
read-write: OK
write-write: NO
The below data proves mixed workload performs well 11 times and there is
also enhance on write-write path because current rw-semaphore doesn't
support SPIN_ON_OWNER. It's side effect but anyway good thing for us.
Write-related tests perform better (from 61% to 1058%) but read path has
good/bad(from -2.22% to 1.45%) but they are all marginal within stddev.
CPU 12
iozone -t -T -l 12 -u 12 -r 16K -s 60M -I +Z -V 0
==Initial write ==Initial write
records: 10 records: 10
avg: 516189.16 avg: 839907.96
std: 22486.53 (4.36%) std: 47902.17 (5.70%)
max: 546970.60 max: 909910.35
min: 481131.54 min: 751148.38
==Rewrite ==Rewrite
records: 10 records: 10
avg: 509527.98 avg: 1050156.37
std: 45799.94 (8.99%) std: 40695.44 (3.88%)
max: 611574.27 max: 1111929.26
min: 443679.95 min: 980409.62
==Read ==Read
records: 10 records: 10
avg: 4408624.17 avg: 4472546.76
std: 281152.61 (6.38%) std: 163662.78 (3.66%)
max: 4867888.66 max: 4727351.03
min: 4058347.69 min: 4126520.88
==Re-read ==Re-read
records: 10 records: 10
avg: 4462147.53 avg: 4363257.75
std: 283546.11 (6.35%) std: 247292.63 (5.67%)
max: 4912894.44 max: 4677241.75
min: 4131386.50 min: 4035235.84
==Reverse Read ==Reverse Read
records: 10 records: 10
avg: 4565865.97 avg: 4485818.08
std: 313395.63 (6.86%) std: 248470.10 (5.54%)
max: 5232749.16 max: 4789749.94
min: 4185809.62 min: 3963081.34
==Stride read ==Stride read
records: 10 records: 10
avg: 4515981.80 avg: 4418806.01
std: 211192.32 (4.68%) std: 212837.97 (4.82%)
max: 4889287.28 max: 4686967.22
min: 4210362.00 min: 4083041.84
==Random read ==Random read
records: 10 records: 10
avg: 4410525.23 avg: 4387093.18
std: 236693.22 (5.37%) std: 235285.23 (5.36%)
max: 4713698.47 max: 4669760.62
min: 4057163.62 min: 3952002.16
==Mixed workload ==Mixed workload
records: 10 records: 10
avg: 243234.25 avg: 2818677.27
std: 28505.07 (11.72%) std: 195569.70 (6.94%)
max: 288905.23 max: 3126478.11
min: 212473.16 min: 2484150.69
==Random write ==Random write
records: 10 records: 10
avg: 555887.07 avg: 1053057.79
std: 70841.98 (12.74%) std: 35195.36 (3.34%)
max: 683188.28 max: 1096125.73
min: 437299.57 min: 992481.93
==Pwrite ==Pwrite
records: 10 records: 10
avg: 501745.93 avg: 810363.09
std: 16373.54 (3.26%) std: 19245.01 (2.37%)
max: 518724.52 max: 833359.70
min: 464208.73 min: 765501.87
==Pread ==Pread
records: 10 records: 10
avg: 4539894.60 avg: 4457680.58
std: 197094.66 (4.34%) std: 188965.60 (4.24%)
max: 4877170.38 max: 4689905.53
min: 4226326.03 min: 4095739.72
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Commit a0c516cbfc74 ("zram: don't grab mutex in zram_slot_free_noity")
introduced free request pending code to avoid scheduling by mutex under
spinlock and it was a mess which made code lenghty and increased
overhead.
Now, we don't need zram->lock any more to free slot so this patch
reverts it and then, tb_lock should protect it.
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Currently, the zram table is protected by zram->lock but it's rather
coarse-grained lock and it makes hard for scalibility.
Let's use own rwlock instead of depending on zram->lock. This patch
adds new locking so obviously, it would make slow but this patch is just
prepartion for removing coarse-grained rw_semaphore(ie, zram->lock)
which is hurdle about zram scalability.
Final patch in this patchset series will remove the lock from read-path
and change rw_semaphore with mutex in write path. With bonus, we could
drop pending slot free mess in next patch.
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Some of fields in zram->stats are protected by zram->lock which is
rather coarse-grained so let's use atomic operation without explict
locking.
This patch is ready for removing dependency of zram->lock in read path
which is very coarse-grained rw_semaphore. Of course, this patch adds
new atomic operation so it might make slow but my 12CPU test couldn't
spot any regression. All gain/lose is marginal within stddev.
iozone -t -T -l 12 -u 12 -r 16K -s 60M -I +Z -V 0
==Initial write ==Initial write
records: 50 records: 50
avg: 412875.17 avg: 415638.23
std: 38543.12 (9.34%) std: 36601.11 (8.81%)
max: 521262.03 max: 502976.72
min: 343263.13 min: 351389.12
==Rewrite ==Rewrite
records: 50 records: 50
avg: 416640.34 avg: 397914.33
std: 60798.92 (14.59%) std: 46150.42 (11.60%)
max: 543057.07 max: 522669.17
min: 304071.67 min: 316588.77
==Read ==Read
records: 50 records: 50
avg: 4147338.63 avg: 4070736.51
std: 179333.25 (4.32%) std: 223499.89 (5.49%)
max: 4459295.28 max: 4539514.44
min: 3753057.53 min: 3444686.31
==Re-read ==Re-read
records: 50 records: 50
avg: 4096706.71 avg: 4117218.57
std: 229735.04 (5.61%) std: 171676.25 (4.17%)
max: 4430012.09 max: 4459263.94
min: 2987217.80 min: 3666904.28
==Reverse Read ==Reverse Read
records: 50 records: 50
avg: 4062763.83 avg: 4078508.32
std: 186208.46 (4.58%) std: 172684.34 (4.23%)
max: 4401358.78 max: 4424757.22
min: 3381625.00 min: 3679359.94
==Stride read ==Stride read
records: 50 records: 50
avg: 4094933.49 avg: 4082170.22
std: 185710.52 (4.54%) std: 196346.68 (4.81%)
max: 4478241.25 max: 4460060.97
min: 3732593.23 min: 3584125.78
==Random read ==Random read
records: 50 records: 50
avg: 4031070.04 avg: 4074847.49
std: 192065.51 (4.76%) std: 206911.33 (5.08%)
max: 4356931.16 max: 4399442.56
min: 3481619.62 min: 3548372.44
==Mixed workload ==Mixed workload
records: 50 records: 50
avg: 149925.73 avg: 149675.54
std: 7701.26 (5.14%) std: 6902.09 (4.61%)
max: 191301.56 max: 175162.05
min: 133566.28 min: 137762.87
==Random write ==Random write
records: 50 records: 50
avg: 404050.11 avg: 393021.47
std: 58887.57 (14.57%) std: 42813.70 (10.89%)
max: 601798.09 max: 524533.43
min: 325176.99 min: 313255.34
==Pwrite ==Pwrite
records: 50 records: 50
avg: 411217.70 avg: 411237.96
std: 43114.99 (10.48%) std: 33136.29 (8.06%)
max: 530766.79 max: 471899.76
min: 320786.84 min: 317906.94
==Pread ==Pread
records: 50 records: 50
avg: 4154908.65 avg: 4087121.92
std: 151272.08 (3.64%) std: 219505.04 (5.37%)
max: 4459478.12 max: 4435857.38
min: 3730512.41 min: 3101101.67
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Add my copyright to the zram source code which I maintain.
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Conflicts:
drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.h
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Remove the old private compcache project address so upcoming patches
should be sent to LKML because we Linux kernel community will take care.
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Conflicts:
drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.h
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Add my copyright to the zsmalloc source code which I maintain.
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Zram has lived in staging for a LONG LONG time and have been
fixed/improved by many contributors so code is clean and stable now. Of
course, there are lots of product using zram in real practice.
The major TV companys have used zram as swap since two years ago and
recently our production team released android smart phone with zram
which is used as swap, too and recently Android Kitkat start to use zram
for small memory smart phone. And there was a report Google released
their ChromeOS with zram, too and cyanogenmod have been used zram long
time ago. And I heard some disto have used zram block device for tmpfs.
In addition, I saw many report from many other peoples. For example,
Lubuntu start to use it.
The benefit of zram is very clear. With my experience, one of the
benefit was to remove jitter of video application with backgroud memory
pressure. It would be effect of efficient memory usage by compression
but more issue is whether swap is there or not in the system. Recent
mobile platforms have used JAVA so there are many anonymous pages. But
embedded system normally are reluctant to use eMMC or SDCard as swap
because there is wear-leveling and latency issues so if we do not use
swap, it means we can't reclaim anoymous pages and at last, we could
encounter OOM kill. :(
Although we have real storage as swap, it was a problem, too. Because
it sometime ends up making system very unresponsible caused by slow swap
storage performance.
Quote from Luigi on Google
"Since Chrome OS was mentioned: the main reason why we don't use swap
to a disk (rotating or SSD) is because it doesn't degrade gracefully
and leads to a bad interactive experience. Generally we prefer to
manage RAM at a higher level, by transparently killing and restarting
processes. But we noticed that zram is fast enough to be competitive
with the latter, and it lets us make more efficient use of the
available RAM. " and he announced.
http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-mm/msg57717.html
Other uses case is to use zram for block device. Zram is block device
so anyone can format the block device and mount on it so some guys on
the internet start zram as /var/tmp.
http://forums.gentoo.org/viewtopic-t-838198-start-0.html
Let's promote zram and enhance/maintain it instead of removing.
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Luigi Semenzato <semenzato@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Conflicts:
drivers/block/Makefile
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This patch moves zsmalloc under mm directory.
Before that, description will explain why we have needed custom
allocator.
Zsmalloc is a new slab-based memory allocator for storing compressed
pages. It is designed for low fragmentation and high allocation success
rate on large object, but <= PAGE_SIZE allocations.
zsmalloc differs from the kernel slab allocator in two primary ways to
achieve these design goals.
zsmalloc never requires high order page allocations to back slabs, or
"size classes" in zsmalloc terms. Instead it allows multiple
single-order pages to be stitched together into a "zspage" which backs
the slab. This allows for higher allocation success rate under memory
pressure.
Also, zsmalloc allows objects to span page boundaries within the zspage.
This allows for lower fragmentation than could be had with the kernel
slab allocator for objects between PAGE_SIZE/2 and PAGE_SIZE. With the
kernel slab allocator, if a page compresses to 60% of it original size,
the memory savings gained through compression is lost in fragmentation
because another object of the same size can't be stored in the leftover
space.
This ability to span pages results in zsmalloc allocations not being
directly addressable by the user. The user is given an
non-dereferencable handle in response to an allocation request. That
handle must be mapped, using zs_map_object(), which returns a pointer to
the mapped region that can be used. The mapping is necessary since the
object data may reside in two different noncontigious pages.
The zsmalloc fulfills the allocation needs for zram perfectly
[sjenning@linux.vnet.ibm.com: borrow Seth's quote]
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Luigi Semenzato <semenzato@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Conflicts:
mm/Kconfig
mm/Makefile
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Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with
a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn. This patch is heavily based
on Christoph's patch.
===== The status quo =====
On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel. To
perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that
they hold.
Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP),
inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X). When the kernel checks for a
capability, it checks pE. The other capability masks serve to modify
what capabilities can be in pE.
Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time. If a
task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI.
If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it
can remove capabilities from X.
Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also
have capabilities. A file can have no capabilty information at all [1].
If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP)
and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2].
File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them.
A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for
the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e. the binary itself if that
binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In
the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old
value and pZ' represents the new value. The rules are:
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0)
X is unchanged
For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately
complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior. Similarly, if
euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently
(primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set). For nonroot
users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP
are empty and fE is false.
As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is
set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set,
LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc.
This is rather messy. We've learned that making any changes is
dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged
program to change its security state in a way that persists cross
execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this
persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped
programs to be exploited for privilege escalation.
===== The problem =====
Capability inheritance is basically useless.
If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so
your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'. This means that you
can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated
capabilities if you aren't root.
On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to
the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files. This causes
pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works. No one does this because
it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems.
If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with
secure exec rules, breaking many things.
This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use
capabilities for anything useful.
===== The proposed change =====
This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA).
pA does what most people expect pI to do.
pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not
set in both pP and pI. Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from
pA. This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities
still do so, with a complication. Because capability inheritance is so
broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and
then calling execve effectively drops capabilities. Therefore,
setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set. Processes that don't like this can
re-add bits to pA afterwards.
The capability evolution rules are changed:
pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA)
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA')
X is unchanged
If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA. If
you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE. For
example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can
automatically bind low-numbered ports. Hallelujah!
Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a
nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace)
and unprivileged process trees. This is currently more or less
impossible. Hallelujah!
You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped
program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the
resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch.
Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that
capability. If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping
privileges will still work.
It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could
possibly be reduced without causing serious problems. Specifically, if
we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries
and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could
leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker
*already* has those capabilities. This would make me nervous, though --
setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so,
and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have
unexpected side effects. (Whether these unexpected side effects would
be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more
paranoid route. We can revisit this later.
An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting
ambient capabilities. I think that this would be annoying and would
make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities
(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than
it is with this patch.
===== Footnotes =====
[1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have
unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false.
The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason.
[2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously
misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong. fE is *not* a mask;
it's a single bit. This has probably confused every single person who
has tried to use file capabilities.
[3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter
if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results from thinking
about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly
discarded.
Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2
Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality
(from Christoph):
/*
* Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell
* that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities.
*
* (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
* Released under: GPL v3 or later.
*
*
* Compile using:
*
* gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng
*
* This program must have the following capabilities to run properly:
* Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE
*
* A command to equip the binary with the right caps is:
*
* setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test
*
*
* To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes:
*
* ./ambient_test /bin/bash
*
*
* Verifying that it works:
*
* From the bash spawed by ambient_test run
*
* cat /proc/$$/status
*
* and have a look at the capabilities.
*/
/*
* Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed
* when the /usr/include files have these defined.
*/
static void set_ambient_cap(int cap)
{
int rc;
capng_get_caps_process();
rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap);
if (rc) {
printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n");
exit(2);
}
capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS);
/* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */
if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) {
perror("Cannot set cap");
exit(1);
}
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int rc;
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE);
printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n");
if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1))
perror("Cannot exec");
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 58319057b7847667f0c9585b9de0e8932b0fdb08)
Bug: 31038224
Change-Id: I88bc5caa782dc6be23dc7e839ff8e11b9a903f8c
Signed-off-by: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@google.com>
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Without this length argument, we can read past the end of the iovec in
memcpy_toiovec because we have no way of knowing the total length of the
iovec's buffers.
This is needed for stable kernels where 89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb
csum races when peeking") has been backported but that don't have the
ioviter conversion, which is almost all the stable trees <= 3.18.
This also fixes a kernel crash for NFS servers when the client uses
-onfsvers=3,proto=udp to mount the export.
Change-Id: I1865e3d7a1faee42a5008a9ad58c4d3323ea4bab
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1644c6f70701fea6b3f8bbe3130d5633a5ec14f0)
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commit 19be0eaffa3ac7d8eb6784ad9bdbc7d67ed8e619 upstream.
This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once
(badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db9757a ("Fix
get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to
problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404e5 ("fix get_user_pages bug").
In the meantime, the s390 situation has long been fixed, and we can now
fix it by checking the pte_dirty() bit properly (and do it better). The
s390 dirty bit was implemented in abf09bed3cce ("s390/mm: implement
software dirty bits") which made it into v3.9. Earlier kernels will
have to look at the page state itself.
Also, the VM has become more scalable, and what used a purely
theoretical race back then has become easier to trigger.
To fix it, we introduce a new internal FOLL_COW flag to mark the "yes,
we already did a COW" rather than play racy games with FOLL_WRITE that
is very fundamental, and then use the pte dirty flag to validate that
the FOLL_COW flag is still valid.
Reported-and-tested-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[wt: s/gup.c/memory.c; s/follow_page_pte/follow_page_mask;
s/faultin_page/__get_user_page]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 69874ec233871a62e1bc8c89e643993af93a8630 upstream.
Add the device ID for the PF of the NFP4000. The device ID for the VF,
0x6003, is already present as PCI_DEVICE_ID_NETRONOME_NFP6000_VF.
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit a755e169031dac9ebaed03302c4921687c271d62 upstream.
Device IDs for the Netronome NFP3200, NFP3240, NFP6000, and NFP6000 SR-IOV
devices.
Signed-off-by: Jason S. McMullan <jason.mcmullan@netronome.com>
[simon: edited changelog]
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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