| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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[ Upstream commit 9e47a4c9fc58032ee135bf76516809c7624b1551 ]
If the block size or cluster size is insane, reject the mount. This
is important for security reasons (although we shouldn't be just
depending on this check).
Ref: http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/539661
Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1332506
Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit cd6bb35bf7f6d7d922509bf50265383a0ceabe96 ]
Centralize the checks for inodes_per_block and be more strict to make
sure the inodes_per_block_group can't end up being zero.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit c48ae41bafe31e9a66d8be2ced4e42a6b57fa814 ]
The commit "ext4: sanity check the block and cluster size at mount
time" should prevent any problems, but in case the superblock is
modified while the file system is mounted, add an extra safety check
to make sure we won't overrun the allocated buffer.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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commit 554a5ccc4e4a20c5f3ec859de0842db4b4b9c77e upstream.
If we hit this error when mounted with errors=continue or
errors=remount-ro:
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used:2940: comm ext4.exe: Allocating blocks 5090-6081 which overlap fs metadata
then ext4_mb_new_blocks() will call ext4_mb_release_context() and try to
continue. However, ext4_mb_release_context() is the wrong thing to call
here since we are still actually using the allocation context.
Instead, just error out. We could retry the allocation, but there is a
possibility of getting stuck in an infinite loop instead, so this seems
safer.
[ Fixed up so we don't return EAGAIN to userspace. --tytso ]
Fixes: 8556e8f3b6 ("ext4: Don't allow new groups to be added during block allocation")
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[wt: 3.10 doesn't have EFSCORRUPTED, but XFS uses EUCLEAN as does 3.14
on this patch so use this instead]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit c65d5c6c81a1f27dec5f627f67840726fcd146de upstream.
If we encounter a filesystem error during orphan cleanup, we should stop.
Otherwise, we may end up in an infinite loop where the same inode is
processed again and again.
EXT4-fs (loop0): warning: checktime reached, running e2fsck is recommended
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:758: group 2, block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 6117 vs 0 free clusters
Aborting journal on device loop0-8.
EXT4-fs (loop0): Remounting filesystem read-only
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_free_blocks:4895: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_do_update_inode:4893: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_do_update_inode:4893: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_ext_remove_space:3068: IO failure
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_ext_truncate:4667: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_orphan_del:2927: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_do_update_inode:4893: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs (loop0): Inode 16 (00000000618192a0): orphan list check failed!
[...]
EXT4-fs (loop0): Inode 16 (0000000061819748): orphan list check failed!
[...]
EXT4-fs (loop0): Inode 16 (0000000061819bf0): orphan list check failed!
[...]
See-also: c9eb13a9105 ("ext4: fix hang when processing corrupted orphaned inode list")
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 6a7fd522a7c94cdef0a3b08acf8e6702056e635c upstream.
If ext4_fill_super() fails early, it's possible for ext4_evict_inode()
to call ext4_should_journal_data() before superblock options and flags
are fully set up. In that case, the iput() on the journal inode can
end up causing a BUG().
Work around this problem by reordering the tests so we only call
ext4_should_journal_data() after we know it's not the journal inode.
Fixes: 2d859db3e4 ("ext4: fix data corruption in inodes with journalled data")
Fixes: 2b405bfa84 ("ext4: fix data=journal fast mount/umount hang")
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit f70749ca42943faa4d4dcce46dfdcaadb1d0c4b6 upstream.
An extent with lblock = 4294967295 and len = 1 will pass the
ext4_valid_extent() test:
ext4_lblk_t last = lblock + len - 1;
if (len == 0 || lblock > last)
return 0;
since last = 4294967295 + 1 - 1 = 4294967295. This would later trigger
the BUG_ON(es->es_lblk + es->es_len < es->es_lblk) in ext4_es_end().
We can simplify it by removing the - 1 altogether and changing the test
to use lblock + len <= lblock, since now if len = 0, then lblock + 0 ==
lblock and it fails, and if len > 0 then lblock + len > lblock in order
to pass (i.e. it doesn't overflow).
Fixes: 5946d0893 ("ext4: check for overlapping extents in ext4_valid_extent_entries()")
Fixes: 2f974865f ("ext4: check for zero length extent explicitly")
Cc: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 7bc9491645118c9461bd21099c31755ff6783593 upstream.
Although the extent tree depth of 5 should enough be for the worst
case of 2*32 extents of length 1, the extent tree code does not
currently to merge nodes which are less than half-full with a sibling
node, or to shrink the tree depth if possible. So it's possible, at
least in theory, for the tree depth to be greater than 5. However,
even in the worst case, a tree depth of 32 is highly unlikely, and if
the file system is maliciously corrupted, an insanely large eh_depth
can cause memory allocation failures that will trigger kernel warnings
(here, eh_depth = 65280):
JBD2: ext4.exe wants too many credits credits:195849 rsv_credits:0 max:256
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 50 at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:293 start_this_handle+0x569/0x580
CPU: 0 PID: 50 Comm: ext4.exe Not tainted 4.7.0-rc5+ #508
Stack:
604a8947 625badd8 0002fd09 00000000
60078643 00000000 62623910 601bf9bc
62623970 6002fc84 626239b0 900000125
Call Trace:
[<6001c2dc>] show_stack+0xdc/0x1a0
[<601bf9bc>] dump_stack+0x2a/0x2e
[<6002fc84>] __warn+0x114/0x140
[<6002fdff>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1f/0x30
[<60165829>] start_this_handle+0x569/0x580
[<60165d4e>] jbd2__journal_start+0x11e/0x220
[<60146690>] __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x60/0xa0
[<60120a81>] ext4_truncate+0x131/0x3a0
[<60123677>] ext4_setattr+0x757/0x840
[<600d5d0f>] notify_change+0x16f/0x2a0
[<600b2b16>] do_truncate+0x76/0xc0
[<600c3e56>] path_openat+0x806/0x1300
[<600c55c9>] do_filp_open+0x89/0xf0
[<600b4074>] do_sys_open+0x134/0x1e0
[<600b4140>] SyS_open+0x20/0x30
[<6001ea68>] handle_syscall+0x88/0x90
[<600295fd>] userspace+0x3fd/0x500
[<6001ac55>] fork_handler+0x85/0x90
---[ end trace 08b0b88b6387a244 ]---
[ Commit message modified and the extent tree depath check changed
from 5 to 32 -- tytso ]
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 935244cd54b86ca46e69bc6604d2adfb1aec2d42 upstream.
Currently, in ext4_mb_init(), there's a loop like the following:
do {
...
offset += 1 << (sb->s_blocksize_bits - i);
i++;
} while (i <= sb->s_blocksize_bits + 1);
Note that the updated offset is used in the loop's next iteration only.
However, at the last iteration, that is at i == sb->s_blocksize_bits + 1,
the shift count becomes equal to (unsigned)-1 > 31 (c.f. C99 6.5.7(3))
and UBSAN reports
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in fs/ext4/mballoc.c:2621:15
shift exponent 4294967295 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
[...]
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff818c4d25>] dump_stack+0xbc/0x117
[<ffffffff818c4c69>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x169/0x169
[<ffffffff819411ab>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x4e
[<ffffffff81941cac>] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1fb/0x254
[<ffffffff81941ab1>] ? __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0x158/0x158
[<ffffffff814b6dc1>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x101/0x390
[<ffffffff816fc13b>] ? ext4_mb_init+0x13b/0xfd0
[<ffffffff814293c7>] ? create_cache+0x57/0x1f0
[<ffffffff8142948a>] ? create_cache+0x11a/0x1f0
[<ffffffff821c2168>] ? mutex_lock+0x38/0x60
[<ffffffff821c23ab>] ? mutex_unlock+0x1b/0x50
[<ffffffff814c26ab>] ? put_online_mems+0x5b/0xc0
[<ffffffff81429677>] ? kmem_cache_create+0x117/0x2c0
[<ffffffff816fcc49>] ext4_mb_init+0xc49/0xfd0
[...]
Observe that the mentioned shift exponent, 4294967295, equals (unsigned)-1.
Unless compilers start to do some fancy transformations (which at least
GCC 6.0.0 doesn't currently do), the issue is of cosmetic nature only: the
such calculated value of offset is never used again.
Silence UBSAN by introducing another variable, offset_incr, holding the
next increment to apply to offset and adjust that one by right shifting it
by one position per loop iteration.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=114701
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112161
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit b5cb316cdf3a3f5f6125412b0f6065185240cfdc upstream.
Currently, in mb_find_order_for_block(), there's a loop like the following:
while (order <= e4b->bd_blkbits + 1) {
...
bb += 1 << (e4b->bd_blkbits - order);
}
Note that the updated bb is used in the loop's next iteration only.
However, at the last iteration, that is at order == e4b->bd_blkbits + 1,
the shift count becomes negative (c.f. C99 6.5.7(3)) and UBSAN reports
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in fs/ext4/mballoc.c:1281:11
shift exponent -1 is negative
[...]
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff818c4d35>] dump_stack+0xbc/0x117
[<ffffffff818c4c79>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x169/0x169
[<ffffffff819411bb>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x4e
[<ffffffff81941cbc>] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1fb/0x254
[<ffffffff81941ac1>] ? __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0x158/0x158
[<ffffffff816e93a0>] ? ext4_mb_generate_from_pa+0x590/0x590
[<ffffffff816502c8>] ? ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait+0x598/0xe80
[<ffffffff816e7b7e>] mb_find_order_for_block+0x1ce/0x240
[...]
Unless compilers start to do some fancy transformations (which at least
GCC 6.0.0 doesn't currently do), the issue is of cosmetic nature only: the
such calculated value of bb is never used again.
Silence UBSAN by introducing another variable, bb_incr, holding the next
increment to apply to bb and adjust that one by right shifting it by one
position per loop iteration.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=114701
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112161
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit c9eb13a9105e2e418f72e46a2b6da3f49e696902 upstream.
If the orphaned inode list contains inode #5, ext4_iget() returns a
bad inode (since the bootloader inode should never be referenced
directly). Because of the bad inode, we end up processing the inode
repeatedly and this hangs the machine.
This can be reproduced via:
mke2fs -t ext4 /tmp/foo.img 100
debugfs -w -R "ssv last_orphan 5" /tmp/foo.img
mount -o loop /tmp/foo.img /mnt
(But don't do this if you are using an unpatched kernel if you care
about the system staying functional. :-)
This bug was found by the port of American Fuzzy Lop into the kernel
to find file system problems[1]. (Since it *only* happens if inode #5
shows up on the orphan list --- 3, 7, 8, etc. won't do it, it's not
surprising that AFL needed two hours before it found it.)
[1] http://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/AFL%20filesystem%20fuzzing%2C%20Vault%202016_0.pdf
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit daf647d2dd58cec59570d7698a45b98e580f2076 upstream.
With the internal Quota feature, mke2fs creates empty quota inodes and
quota usage tracking is enabled as soon as the file system is mounted.
Since quotacheck is no longer preallocating all of the blocks in the
quota inode that are likely needed to be written to, we are now seeing
a lockdep false positive caused by needing to allocate a quota block
from inside ext4_map_blocks(), while holding i_data_sem for a data
inode. This results in this complaint:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&ei->i_data_sem);
lock(&s->s_dquot.dqio_mutex);
lock(&ei->i_data_sem);
lock(&s->s_dquot.dqio_mutex);
Google-Bug-Id: 27907753
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 5e1021f2b6dff1a86a468a1424d59faae2bc63c1 upstream.
ext4_reserve_inode_write() in ext4_mark_inode_dirty() could fail on
error (e.g. EIO) and iloc.bh can be NULL in this case. But the error is
ignored in the following "if" condition and ext4_expand_extra_isize()
might be called with NULL iloc.bh set, which triggers NULL pointer
dereference.
This is uncovered by commit 8b4953e13f4c ("ext4: reserve code points for
the project quota feature"), which enlarges the ext4_inode size, and
run the following script on new kernel but with old mke2fs:
#/bin/bash
mnt=/mnt/ext4
devname=ext4-error
dev=/dev/mapper/$devname
fsimg=/home/fs.img
trap cleanup 0 1 2 3 9 15
cleanup()
{
umount $mnt >/dev/null 2>&1
dmsetup remove $devname
losetup -d $backend_dev
rm -f $fsimg
exit 0
}
rm -f $fsimg
fallocate -l 1g $fsimg
backend_dev=`losetup -f --show $fsimg`
devsize=`blockdev --getsz $backend_dev`
good_tab="0 $devsize linear $backend_dev 0"
error_tab="0 $devsize error $backend_dev 0"
dmsetup create $devname --table "$good_tab"
mkfs -t ext4 $dev
mount -t ext4 -o errors=continue,strictatime $dev $mnt
dmsetup load $devname --table "$error_tab" && dmsetup resume $devname
echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
ls -l $mnt
exit 0
[ Patch changed to simplify the function a tiny bit. -- Ted ]
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 46901760b46064964b41015d00c140c83aa05bcf upstream.
Since sizeof(ext_new_group_data) > sizeof(ext_new_flex_group_data),
integer overflow could be happened.
Therefore, need to fix integer overflow sanitization.
Signed-off-by: Insu Yun <wuninsu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a4dad1ae24f850410c4e60f22823cba1289b8d52 upstream.
In ext4, the bottom two bits of {a,c,m}time_extra are used to extend
the {a,c,m}time fields, deferring the year 2038 problem to the year
2446.
When decoding these extended fields, for times whose bottom 32 bits
would represent a negative number, sign extension causes the 64-bit
extended timestamp to be negative as well, which is not what's
intended. This patch corrects that issue, so that the only negative
{a,c,m}times are those between 1901 and 1970 (as per 32-bit signed
timestamps).
Some older kernels might have written pre-1970 dates with 1,1 in the
extra bits. This patch treats those incorrectly-encoded dates as
pre-1970, instead of post-2311, until kernel 4.20 is released.
Hopefully by then e2fsck will have fixed up the bad data.
Also add a comment explaining the encoding of ext4's extra {a,c,m}time
bits.
Signed-off-by: David Turner <novalis@novalis.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: Mark Harris <mh8928@yahoo.com>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=23732
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 904dad4742d211b7a8910e92695c0fa957483836 upstream.
"group" is the group where the backup will be placed, and is
initialized to zero in the declaration. This meant that backups for
meta_bg descriptors were erroneously written to the backup block group
descriptors in groups 1 and (desc_per_block-1).
Reproduction information:
mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 -b 1024 -O ^resize_inode /tmp/foo.img 16G
truncate -s 24G /tmp/foo.img
losetup /dev/loop0 /tmp/foo.img
mount /dev/loop0 /mnt
resize2fs /dev/loop0
umount /dev/loop0
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/loop0 bs=1024 count=2
e2fsck -fy /dev/loop0
losetup -d /dev/loop0
Signed-off-by: Andy Leiserson <andy@leiserson.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4327ba52afd03fc4b5afa0ee1d774c9c5b0e85c5 upstream.
If a EXT4 filesystem utilizes JBD2 journaling and an error occurs, the
journaling will be aborted first and the error number will be recorded
into JBD2 superblock and, finally, the system will enter into the
panic state in "errors=panic" option. But, in the rare case, this
sequence is little twisted like the below figure and it will happen
that the system enters into panic state, which means the system reset
in mobile environment, before completion of recording an error in the
journal superblock. In this case, e2fsck cannot recognize that the
filesystem failure occurred in the previous run and the corruption
wouldn't be fixed.
Task A Task B
ext4_handle_error()
-> jbd2_journal_abort()
-> __journal_abort_soft()
-> __jbd2_journal_abort_hard()
| -> journal->j_flags |= JBD2_ABORT;
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| __ext4_abort()
| -> jbd2_journal_abort()
| | -> __journal_abort_soft()
| | -> if (journal->j_flags & JBD2_ABORT)
| | return;
| -> panic()
|
-> jbd2_journal_update_sb_errno()
Tested-by: Hobin Woo <hobin.woo@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Daeho Jeong <daeho.jeong@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7444a072c387a93ebee7066e8aee776954ab0e41 upstream.
ext4_free_blocks is looping around the allocation request and mimics
__GFP_NOFAIL behavior without any allocation fallback strategy. Let's
remove the open coded loop and replace it with __GFP_NOFAIL. Without the
flag the allocator has no way to find out never-fail requirement and
cannot help in any way.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8974fec7d72e3e02752fe0f27b4c3719c78d9a15 upstream.
Currently ext4_ind_migrate() doesn't correctly handle a file which
contains a hole at the beginning of the file. This caused the migration
to be done incorrectly, and then if there is a subsequent following
delayed allocation write to the "hole", this would reclaim the same data
blocks again and results in fs corruption.
# assmuing 4k block size ext4, with delalloc enabled
# skip the first block and write to the second block
xfs_io -fc "pwrite 4k 4k" -c "fsync" /mnt/ext4/testfile
# converting to indirect-mapped file, which would move the data blocks
# to the beginning of the file, but extent status cache still marks
# that region as a hole
chattr -e /mnt/ext4/testfile
# delayed allocation writes to the "hole", reclaim the same data block
# again, results in i_blocks corruption
xfs_io -c "pwrite 0 4k" /mnt/ext4/testfile
umount /mnt/ext4
e2fsck -nf /dev/sda6
...
Inode 53, i_blocks is 16, should be 8. Fix? no
...
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d6f123a9297496ad0b6335fe881504c4b5b2a5e5 upstream.
Currently the check in ext4_ind_migrate() is not enough before doing the
real conversion:
a) delayed allocated extents could bypass the check on eh->eh_entries
and eh->eh_depth
This can be demonstrated by this script
xfs_io -fc "pwrite 0 4k" -c "pwrite 8k 4k" /mnt/ext4/testfile
chattr -e /mnt/ext4/testfile
where testfile has two extents but still be converted to non-extent
based file format.
b) only extent length is checked but not the offset, which would result
in data lose (delalloc) or fs corruption (nodelalloc), because
non-extent based file only supports at most (12 + 2^10 + 2^20 + 2^30)
blocks
This can be demostrated by
xfs_io -fc "pwrite 5T 4k" /mnt/ext4/testfile
chattr -e /mnt/ext4/testfile
sync
If delalloc is enabled, dmesg prints
EXT4-fs warning (device dm-4): ext4_block_to_path:105: block 1342177280 > max in inode 53
EXT4-fs (dm-4): Delayed block allocation failed for inode 53 at logical offset 1342177280 with max blocks 1 with error 5
EXT4-fs (dm-4): This should not happen!! Data will be lost
If delalloc is disabled, e2fsck -nf shows corruption
Inode 53, i_size is 5497558142976, should be 4096. Fix? no
Fix the two issues by
a) forcing all delayed allocation blocks to be allocated before checking
eh->eh_depth and eh->eh_entries
b) limiting the last logical block of the extent is within direct map
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9705acd63b125dee8b15c705216d7186daea4625 upstream.
On delalloc enabled file system on invalidatepage operation
in ext4_da_page_release_reservation() we want to clear the delayed
buffer and remove the extent covering the delayed buffer from the extent
status tree.
However currently there is a bug where on the systems with page size >
block size we will always remove extents from the start of the page
regardless where the actual delayed buffers are positioned in the page.
This leads to the errors like this:
EXT4-fs warning (device loop0): ext4_da_release_space:1225:
ext4_da_release_space: ino 13, to_free 1 with only 0 reserved data
blocks
This however can cause data loss on writeback time if the file system is
in ENOSPC condition because we're releasing reservation for someones
else delayed buffer.
Fix this by only removing extents that corresponds to the part of the
page we want to invalidate.
This problem is reproducible by the following fio receipt (however I was
only able to reproduce it with fio-2.1 or older.
[global]
bs=8k
iodepth=1024
iodepth_batch=60
randrepeat=1
size=1m
directory=/mnt/test
numjobs=20
[job1]
ioengine=sync
bs=1k
direct=1
rw=randread
filename=file1:file2
[job2]
ioengine=libaio
rw=randwrite
direct=1
filename=file1:file2
[job3]
bs=1k
ioengine=posixaio
rw=randwrite
direct=1
filename=file1:file2
[job5]
bs=1k
ioengine=sync
rw=randread
filename=file1:file2
[job7]
ioengine=libaio
rw=randwrite
filename=file1:file2
[job8]
ioengine=posixaio
rw=randwrite
filename=file1:file2
[job10]
ioengine=mmap
rw=randwrite
bs=1k
filename=file1:file2
[job11]
ioengine=mmap
rw=randwrite
direct=1
filename=file1:file2
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 292db1bc6c105d86111e858859456bcb11f90f91 upstream.
ext4 isn't willing to map clusters to a non-extent file. Don't signal
this with an out of space error, since the FS will retry the
allocation (which didn't fail) forever. Instead, return EUCLEAN so
that the operation will fail immediately all the way back to userspace.
(The fix is either to run e2fsck -E bmap2extent, or to chattr +e the file.)
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 89d96a6f8e6491f24fc8f99fd6ae66820e85c6c1 upstream.
Normally all of the buffers will have been forced out to disk before
we call invalidate_bdev(), but there will be some cases, where a file
system operation was aborted due to an ext4_error(), where there may
still be some dirty buffers in the buffer cache for the device. So
try to force them out to memory before calling invalidate_bdev().
This fixes a warning triggered by generic/081:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3473 at /usr/projects/linux/ext4/fs/block_dev.c:56 __blkdev_put+0xb5/0x16f()
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bdf96838aea6a265f2ae6cbcfb12a778c84a0b8e upstream.
The commit cf108bca465d: "ext4: Invert the locking order of page_lock
and transaction start" caused __ext4_journalled_writepage() to drop
the page lock before the page was written back, as part of changing
the locking order to jbd2_journal_start -> page_lock. However, this
introduced a potential race if there was a truncate racing with the
data=journalled writeback mode.
Fix this by grabbing the page lock after starting the journal handle,
and then checking to see if page had gotten truncated out from under
us.
This fixes a number of different warnings or BUG_ON's when running
xfstests generic/086 in data=journalled mode, including:
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata: vdc-8: bad jh for block 115643: transaction (ee3fe7
c0, 164), jh->b_transaction ( (null), 0), jh->b_next_transaction ( (null), 0), jlist 0
- and -
kernel BUG at /usr/projects/linux/ext4/fs/jbd2/transaction.c:2200!
...
Call Trace:
[<c02b2ded>] ? __ext4_journalled_invalidatepage+0x117/0x117
[<c02b2de5>] __ext4_journalled_invalidatepage+0x10f/0x117
[<c02b2ded>] ? __ext4_journalled_invalidatepage+0x117/0x117
[<c027d883>] ? lock_buffer+0x36/0x36
[<c02b2dfa>] ext4_journalled_invalidatepage+0xd/0x22
[<c0229139>] do_invalidatepage+0x22/0x26
[<c0229198>] truncate_inode_page+0x5b/0x85
[<c022934b>] truncate_inode_pages_range+0x156/0x38c
[<c0229592>] truncate_inode_pages+0x11/0x15
[<c022962d>] truncate_pagecache+0x55/0x71
[<c02b913b>] ext4_setattr+0x4a9/0x560
[<c01ca542>] ? current_kernel_time+0x10/0x44
[<c026c4d8>] notify_change+0x1c7/0x2be
[<c0256a00>] do_truncate+0x65/0x85
[<c0226f31>] ? file_ra_state_init+0x12/0x29
- and -
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1331 at /usr/projects/linux/ext4/fs/jbd2/transaction.c:1396
irty_metadata+0x14a/0x1ae()
...
Call Trace:
[<c01b879f>] ? console_unlock+0x3a1/0x3ce
[<c082cbb4>] dump_stack+0x48/0x60
[<c0178b65>] warn_slowpath_common+0x89/0xa0
[<c02ef2cf>] ? jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x14a/0x1ae
[<c0178bef>] warn_slowpath_null+0x14/0x18
[<c02ef2cf>] jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x14a/0x1ae
[<c02d8615>] __ext4_handle_dirty_metadata+0xd4/0x19d
[<c02b2f44>] write_end_fn+0x40/0x53
[<c02b4a16>] ext4_walk_page_buffers+0x4e/0x6a
[<c02b59e7>] ext4_writepage+0x354/0x3b8
[<c02b2f04>] ? mpage_release_unused_pages+0xd4/0xd4
[<c02b1b21>] ? wait_on_buffer+0x2c/0x2c
[<c02b5a4b>] ? ext4_writepage+0x3b8/0x3b8
[<c02b5a5b>] __writepage+0x10/0x2e
[<c0225956>] write_cache_pages+0x22d/0x32c
[<c02b5a4b>] ? ext4_writepage+0x3b8/0x3b8
[<c02b6ee8>] ext4_writepages+0x102/0x607
[<c019adfe>] ? sched_clock_local+0x10/0x10e
[<c01a8a7c>] ? __lock_is_held+0x2e/0x44
[<c01a8ad5>] ? lock_is_held+0x43/0x51
[<c0226dff>] do_writepages+0x1c/0x29
[<c0276bed>] __writeback_single_inode+0xc3/0x545
[<c0277c07>] writeback_sb_inodes+0x21f/0x36d
...
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2f974865ffdfe7b9f46a9940836c8b167342563d upstream.
The following commit introduced a bug when checking for zero length extent
5946d08 ext4: check for overlapping extents in ext4_valid_extent_entries()
Zero length extent could pass the check if lblock is zero.
Adding the explicit check for zero length back.
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit 8f4d8558391: "ext4: fix lazytime optimization" was not a
complete fix. In the case where the inode number is a multiple of 16,
and we could still end up updating an inode with dirty timestamps
written to the wrong inode on disk. Oops.
This can be easily reproduced by using generic/005 with a file system
with metadata_csum and lazytime enabled.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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We had a fencepost error in the lazytime optimization which means that
timestamp would get written to the wrong inode.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Newer versions of mount parse the lazytime feature and pass it to the
mount system call via the flags field in the mount system call,
removing the lazytime string from the mount options list. So we need
to check for the presence of MS_LAZYTIME and set it in sb->s_flags in
order for this flag to be set on a remount.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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Add an optimization for the MS_LAZYTIME mount option so that we will
opportunistically write out any inodes with the I_DIRTY_TIME flag set
in a particular inode table block when we need to update some inode in
that inode table block anyway.
Also add some temporary code so that we can set the lazytime mount
option without needing a modified /sbin/mount program which can set
MS_LAZYTIME. We can eventually make this go away once util-linux has
added support.
Google-Bug-Id: 18297052
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Add a new mount option which enables a new "lazytime" mode. This mode
causes atime, mtime, and ctime updates to only be made to the
in-memory version of the inode. The on-disk times will only get
updated when (a) if the inode needs to be updated for some non-time
related change, (b) if userspace calls fsync(), syncfs() or sync(), or
(c) just before an undeleted inode is evicted from memory.
This is OK according to POSIX because there are no guarantees after a
crash unless userspace explicitly requests via a fsync(2) call.
For workloads which feature a large number of random write to a
preallocated file, the lazytime mount option significantly reduces
writes to the inode table. The repeated 4k writes to a single block
will result in undesirable stress on flash devices and SMR disk
drives. Even on conventional HDD's, the repeated writes to the inode
table block will trigger Adjacent Track Interference (ATI) remediation
latencies, which very negatively impact long tail latencies --- which
is a very big deal for web serving tiers (for example).
Google-Bug-Id: 18297052
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Adative for jolla-kernel
Original by @faux123
The dynamic sync control interface uses Android kernel's unique early
suspend / lat resume interface.
While screen is on, file sync is disabled
when screen is off, a file sync is called to flush all outstanding writes
and restore file sync operation as normal.
Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
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This reverts commit d2cdb4e1ce3df4e28b0e51807455ddf424ff2e71.
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It is very likely that block device inode will be part of BDI dirty list
as well. However it doesn't make sence to sort inodes on the b_io list
just because of this inode (as it contains buffers all over the device
anyway). So save some CPU cycles which is valuable since we hold relatively
contented wb->list_lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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Previously, the no-op "mount -o mount /dev/xxx" operation when the
file system is already mounted read-write causes an implied,
unconditional syncfs(). This seems pretty stupid, and it's certainly
documented or guaraunteed to do this, nor is it particularly useful,
except in the case where the file system was mounted rw and is getting
remounted read-only.
However, it's possible that there might be some file systems that are
actually depending on this behavior. In most file systems, it's
probably fine to only call sync_filesystem() when transitioning from
read-write to read-only, and there are some file systems where this is
not needed at all (for example, for a pseudo-filesystem or something
like romfs).
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: Anders Larsen <al@alarsen.net>
Cc: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mikulas@artax.karlin.mff.cuni.cz>
Cc: Petr Vandrovec <petr@vandrovec.name>
Cc: xfs@oss.sgi.com
Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org
Cc: codalist@coda.cs.cmu.edu
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: cluster-devel@redhat.com
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-nilfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-ntfs-dev@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com
Cc: reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org
Change-Id: Ie6fc68d845b0d327f56e4da91a8a9ba0673e5d5e
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Bug: 28760453
Change-Id: I019c2de559db9e4b95860ab852211b456d78c4ca
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
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This avoids potential problems caused by a race where the inode gets
renamed out from its parent directory and the parent directory is
deleted while ext4_d_revalidate() is running.
Upstream commit: 3d43bcfef5f0548845a425365011c499875491b0
Fixes: 28b4c263961c
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Change-Id: Ia970597753fae0d67fa6eebb972de24d5c1194f8
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We don't want the writeback triggered from the journal commit (in
data=writeback mode) to cause the journal to abort due to
generic_writepages() returning an ENOMEM error. In addition, if
fsync() fails with ENOMEM, most applications will probably not do the
right thing.
So if we are doing a data integrity sync, and ext4_encrypt() returns
ENOMEM, we will submit any queued I/O to date, and then retry the
allocation using GFP_NOFAIL.
Upstream commit: c9af28fdd44922a6c10c9f8315718408af98e315
Google-Bug-Id: 27641567
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Change-Id: I55b6ab35c9ad4eb2ca6d06380755395f17525496
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We aren't checking to see if the in-inode extended attribute is
corrupted before we try to expand the inode's extra isize fields.
This can lead to potential crashes caused by the BUG_ON() check in
ext4_xattr_shift_entries().
Upstream commit: 9e92f48c34eb2b9af9d12f892e2fe1fce5e8ce35
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Change-Id: Idd5c5eaaaf7e244e3d310fc528840c13ce4c44a4
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When ext4_bread() fails, fname_crypto_str remains
allocated after return. Fix that.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@google.com>
Change-Id: Ie137cb7be090c52c65c65872035b537ece8c2f17
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Add a validation check for dentries for encrypted directory to make
sure we're not caching stale data after a key has been added or removed.
Also check to make sure that status of the encryption key is updated
when readdir(2) is executed.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@google.com>
Change-Id: Ic7a90d79d9447272fc512ae2abbd299523de02b8
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A number of functions include ext4_add_dx_entry, make_indexed_dir,
etc. are being passed a dentry even though the only thing they use is
the containing parent. We can shrink the code size slightly by maing
this replacement. This will also be useful in cases where we don't
have a dentry as the argument to the directory entry insert functions.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@google.com>
Change-Id: I9267c577ab4d7d60e34cbf37c71eaf443e637c5f
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Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@google.com>
Change-Id: Ia13629b6512a0c5dd2a09e7e3676c74af20c96a3
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Return value of ext4_derive_key_aes() is stored but not used.
Add test to exit cleanly if ext4_derive_key_aes() fail.
Also fix coverity CID 1309760.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Navet <laurent.navet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@google.com>
Change-Id: I796cdfc65386e546f332a3dbbf9f2c2cd76e3301
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An encrypted file name should never be shorter than an 16 bytes, the
AES block size. The 3.10 crypto layer will oops and crash the kernel
if ciphertext shorter than the block size is passed to it.
Fortunately, in modern kernels the crypto layer will not crash the
kernel in this scenario, but nevertheless, it represents a corrupted
directory, and we should detect it and mark the file system as
corrupted so that e2fsck can fix this.
Change-Id: Ic42808e5161b22ff607689d3570be4d04e6158ed
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@google.com>
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Start a jbd2 transaction, and mark the inode dirty on the inode under
that transaction after setting the encrypt flag. Otherwise if the
directory isn't modified after setting the crypto policy, the
encrypted flag might not survive the inode getting pushed out from
memory, or the the file system getting unmounted and remounted.
Change-Id: I5868e0531881922d8a5e68fa88b6cf2bb1675b99
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@google.com>
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Currently it is possible to lose whole file system block worth of data
when we hit the specific interaction with unwritten and delayed extents
in status extent tree.
The problem is that when we insert delayed extent into extent status
tree the only way to get rid of it is when we write out delayed buffer.
However there is a limitation in the extent status tree implementation
so that when inserting unwritten extent should there be even a single
delayed block the whole unwritten extent would be marked as delayed.
At this point, there is no way to get rid of the delayed extents,
because there are no delayed buffers to write out. So when a we write
into said unwritten extent we will convert it to written, but it still
remains delayed.
When we try to write into that block later ext4_da_map_blocks() will set
the buffer new and delayed and map it to invalid block which causes
the rest of the block to be zeroed loosing already written data.
For now we can fix this by simply not allowing to set delayed status on
written extent in the extent status tree. Also add WARN_ON() to make
sure that we notice if this happens in the future.
This problem can be easily reproduced by running the following xfs_io.
xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xaa 4096 2048" \
-c "falloc 0 131072" \
-c "pwrite -S 0xbb 65536 2048" \
-c "fsync" /mnt/test/fff
echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0xdd 67584 2048" /mnt/test/fff
This can be theoretically also reproduced by at random by running fsx,
but it's not very reliable, though on machines with bigger page size
(like ppc) this can be seen more often (especially xfstest generic/127)
Change-Id: I0ba800f68cf35a0137a5c5b0903017e08bc6f814
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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Fix multiple bugs in ext4_encrypted_zeroout(), including one that
could cause us to write an encrypted zero page to the wrong location
on disk, potentially causing data and file system corruption.
Fortunately, this tends to only show up in stress tests, but even with
these fixes, we are seeing some test failures with generic/127 --- but
these are now caused by data failures instead of metadata corruption.
Since ext4_encrypted_zeroout() is only used for some optimizations to
keep the extent tree from being too fragmented, and
ext4_encrypted_zeroout() itself isn't all that optimized from a time
or IOPS perspective, disable the extent tree optimization for
encrypted inodes for now. This prevents the data corruption issues
reported by generic/127 until we can figure out what's going wrong.
Change-Id: I795e6b479c75f0f930bb47092720c4d7add538da
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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Buggy (or hostile) userspace should not be able to cause the kernel to
crash.
Change-Id: I67f7b32dd458d577b506ddff6ef07955e804e3ff
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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Since ext4_page_crypto() doesn't need an encryption context (at least
not any more), this allows us to simplify a number function signature
and also allows us to avoid needing to allocate a context in
ext4_block_write_begin(). It also means we no longer need a separate
ext4_decrypt_one() function.
Change-Id: I2f83f5745487ef85312bf8469a6b2a190545a5e4
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@google.com>
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There are times when ext4_bio_write_page() is called even though we
don't actually need to do any I/O. This happens when ext4_writepage()
gets called by the jbd2 commit path when an inode needs to force its
pages written out in order to provide data=ordered guarantees --- and
a page is backed by an unwritten (e.g., uninitialized) block on disk,
or if delayed allocation means the page's backing store hasn't been
allocated yet. In that case, we need to skip the call to
ext4_encrypt_page(), since in addition to wasting CPU, it leads to a
bounce page and an ext4 crypto context getting leaked.
Change-Id: Icd2123808fd7372c11e6f9e17849e242837d729d
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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