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* mm: slub: Default slub_max_order to 0Mel Gorman2016-09-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To avoid locking and per-cpu overhead, SLUB optimisically uses high-order allocations up to order-3 by default and falls back to lower allocations if they fail. While care is taken that the caller and kswapd take no unusual steps in response to this, there are further consequences like shrinkers who have to free more objects to release any memory. There is anecdotal evidence that significant time is being spent looping in shrinkers with insufficient progress being made (https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/4/28/361) and keeping kswapd awake. SLUB is now the default allocator and some bug reports have been pinned down to SLUB using high orders during operations like copying large amounts of data. SLUBs use of high-orders benefits applications that are sized to memory appropriately but this does not necessarily apply to large file servers or desktops. This patch causes SLUB to use order-0 pages like SLAB does by default. There is further evidence that this keeps kswapd's usage lower (https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/5/10/383). Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
* kthread_work: wake up worker only when the worker is idleLai Jiangshan2016-09-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | If the worker is already executing a work item when another is queued, we can safely skip wakeup without worrying about stalling queue thus avoiding waking up the busy worker spuriously. Spurious wakeups should be fine but still isn't nice and avoiding it is trivial here. tj: Updated description. Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
* cpufreq: remove race while accessing cur_policyBibek Basu2016-09-101-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While accessing cur_policy during executing events CPUFREQ_GOV_START, CPUFREQ_GOV_STOP, CPUFREQ_GOV_LIMITS, same mutex lock is not taken, dbs_data->mutex, which leads to race and data corruption while running continious suspend resume test. This is seen with ondemand governor with suspend resume test using rtcwake. Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000028 pgd = ed610000 [00000028] *pgd=adf11831, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM Modules linked in: nvhost_vi CPU: 1 PID: 3243 Comm: rtcwake Not tainted 3.10.24-gf5cf9e5 #1 task: ee708040 ti: ed61c000 task.ti: ed61c000 PC is at cpufreq_governor_dbs+0x400/0x634 LR is at cpufreq_governor_dbs+0x3f8/0x634 pc : [<c05652b8>] lr : [<c05652b0>] psr: 600f0013 sp : ed61dcb0 ip : 000493e0 fp : c1cc14f0 r10: 00000000 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00000000 r7 : eb725280 r6 : c1cc1560 r5 : eb575200 r4 : ebad7740 r3 : ee708040 r2 : ed61dca8 r1 : 001ebd24 r0 : 00000000 Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user Control: 10c5387d Table: ad61006a DAC: 00000015 [<c05652b8>] (cpufreq_governor_dbs+0x400/0x634) from [<c055f700>] (__cpufreq_governor+0x98/0x1b4) [<c055f700>] (__cpufreq_governor+0x98/0x1b4) from [<c0560770>] (__cpufreq_set_policy+0x250/0x320) [<c0560770>] (__cpufreq_set_policy+0x250/0x320) from [<c0561dcc>] (cpufreq_update_policy+0xcc/0x168) [<c0561dcc>] (cpufreq_update_policy+0xcc/0x168) from [<c0561ed0>] (cpu_freq_notify+0x68/0xdc) [<c0561ed0>] (cpu_freq_notify+0x68/0xdc) from [<c008eff8>] (notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x8c) [<c008eff8>] (notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x8c) from [<c008f3d4>] (__blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x68) [<c008f3d4>] (__blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x68) from [<c008f40c>] (blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x20/0x28) [<c008f40c>] (blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x20/0x28) from [<c00aac6c>] (pm_qos_update_bounded_target+0xd8/0x310) [<c00aac6c>] (pm_qos_update_bounded_target+0xd8/0x310) from [<c00ab3b0>] (__pm_qos_update_request+0x64/0x70) [<c00ab3b0>] (__pm_qos_update_request+0x64/0x70) from [<c004b4b8>] (tegra_pm_notify+0x114/0x134) [<c004b4b8>] (tegra_pm_notify+0x114/0x134) from [<c008eff8>] (notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x8c) [<c008eff8>] (notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x8c) from [<c008f3d4>] (__blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x68) [<c008f3d4>] (__blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x68) from [<c008f40c>] (blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x20/0x28) [<c008f40c>] (blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x20/0x28) from [<c00ac228>] (pm_notifier_call_chain+0x1c/0x34) [<c00ac228>] (pm_notifier_call_chain+0x1c/0x34) from [<c00ad38c>] (enter_state+0xec/0x128) [<c00ad38c>] (enter_state+0xec/0x128) from [<c00ad400>] (pm_suspend+0x38/0xa4) [<c00ad400>] (pm_suspend+0x38/0xa4) from [<c00ac114>] (state_store+0x70/0xc0) [<c00ac114>] (state_store+0x70/0xc0) from [<c027b1e8>] (kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x20) [<c027b1e8>] (kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x20) from [<c019cd9c>] (sysfs_write_file+0x104/0x184) [<c019cd9c>] (sysfs_write_file+0x104/0x184) from [<c0143038>] (vfs_write+0xd0/0x19c) [<c0143038>] (vfs_write+0xd0/0x19c) from [<c0143414>] (SyS_write+0x4c/0x78) [<c0143414>] (SyS_write+0x4c/0x78) from [<c000f080>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30) Code: e1a00006 eb084346 e59b0020 e5951024 (e5903028) ---[ end trace 0488523c8f6b0f9d ]--- Signed-off-by: Bibek Basu <bbasu@nvidia.com> Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Cc: 3.11+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.11+ Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
* int_sqrt: Improve 3x faster integer sqrt.FlyFrog2016-09-101-15/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Result on 10,000,000 call. Old: sqrt(12345689) = 3513 real 0m0.768s user 0m0.760s sys 0m0.004s New: sqrt(12345689) = 3513 real 0m0.222s user 0m0.224s sys 0m0.000s Signed-off-by: engstk <eng.stk@sapo.pt>
* int_sqrt: correction square root algo with namingramgear2016-09-101-10/+20
| | | | Signed-off-by: engstk <eng.stk@sapo.pt>
* fs: binfmt_elf: fix get_atrandom_bytes defined but not usedanarkia19762016-09-101-19/+0
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* random: sprinkle e/f/prandom in places that deplete entropy oftenimoseyon2016-09-106-6/+6
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* net/packet: merge fiximoseyon2016-09-101-7/+0
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* random.h: declare erandom functionimoseyon2016-09-101-0/+2
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* binfmt_elf: use prandom - do not deplete entropyanarkia19762016-09-101-1/+1
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* random32: use e/frandom for reseeding, and a merge fixupimoseyon2016-09-101-3/+2
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* random: allow architectures to optionally define random_get_entropy()Theodore Ts'o2016-09-102-4/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow architectures which have a disabled get_cycles() function to provide a random_get_entropy() function which provides a fine-grained, rapidly changing counter that can be used by the /dev/random driver. For example, an architecture might have a rapidly changing register used to control random TLB cache eviction, or DRAM refresh that doesn't meet the requirements of get_cycles(), but which is good enough for the needs of the random driver. Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
* random32: add prandom_u32_max and convert open coded usersDaniel Borkmann2016-09-104-16/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Many functions have open coded a function that returns a random number in range [0,N-1]. Under the assumption that we have a PRNG such as taus113 with being well distributed in [0, ~0U] space, we can implement such a function as uword t = (n*m')>>32, where m' is a random number obtained from PRNG, n the right open interval border and t our resulting random number, with n,m',t in u32 universe. Lets go with Joe and simply call it prandom_u32_max(), although technically we have an right open interval endpoint, but that we have documented. Other users can further be migrated to the new prandom_u32_max() function later on; for now, we need to make sure to migrate reciprocal_divide() users for the reciprocal_divide() follow-up fixup since their function signatures are going to change. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Cc: Jakub Zawadzki <darkjames-ws@darkjames.pl> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Conflicts: net/packet/af_packet.c
* random32: improvements to prandom_bytesDaniel Borkmann2016-09-102-23/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch addresses a couple of minor items, mostly addesssing prandom_bytes(): 1) prandom_bytes{,_state}() should use size_t for length arguments, 2) We can use put_unaligned() when filling the array instead of open coding it [ perhaps some archs will further benefit from their own arch specific implementation when GCC cannot make up for it ], 3) Fix a typo, 4) Better use unsigned int as type for getting the arch seed, 5) Make use of prandom_u32_max() for timer slack. Regarding the change to put_unaligned(), callers of prandom_bytes() which internally invoke prandom_bytes_state(), don't bother as they expect the array to be filled randomly and don't have any control of the internal state what-so-ever (that's also why we have periodic reseeding there, etc), so they really don't care. Now for the direct callers of prandom_bytes_state(), which are solely located in test cases for MTD devices, that is, drivers/mtd/tests/{oobtest.c,pagetest.c,subpagetest.c}: These tests basically fill a test write-vector through prandom_bytes_state() with an a-priori defined seed each time and write that to a MTD device. Later on, they set up a read-vector and read back that blocks from the device. So in the verification phase, the write-vector is being re-setup [ so same seed and prandom_bytes_state() called ], and then memcmp()'ed against the read-vector to check if the data is the same. Akinobu, Lothar and I also tested this patch and it runs through the 3 relevant MTD test cases w/o any errors on the nandsim device (simulator for MTD devs) for x86_64, ppc64, ARM (i.MX28, i.MX53 and i.MX6): # modprobe nandsim first_id_byte=0x20 second_id_byte=0xac \ third_id_byte=0x00 fourth_id_byte=0x15 # modprobe mtd_oobtest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_pagetest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_subpagetest dev=0 We also don't have any users depending directly on a particular result of the PRNG (except the PRNG self-test itself), and that's just fine as it e.g. allowed us easily to do things like upgrading from taus88 to taus113. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Tested-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Tested-by: Lothar Waßmann <LW@KARO-electronics.de> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* random32: mix in entropy from core to late initcallHannes Frederic Sowa2016-09-101-21/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, we have a 3-stage seeding process in prandom(): Phase 1 is from the early actual initialization of prandom() subsystem which happens during core_initcall() and remains most likely until the beginning of late_initcall() phase. Here, the system might not have enough entropy available for seeding with strong randomness from the random driver. That means, we currently have a 32bit weak LCG() seeding the PRNG status register 1 and mixing that successively into the other 3 registers just to get it up and running. Phase 2 starts with late_initcall() phase resp. when the random driver has initialized its non-blocking pool with enough entropy. At that time, we throw away *all* inner state from its 4 registers and do a full reseed with strong randomness. Phase 3 starts right after that and does a periodic reseed with random slack of status register 1 by a strong random source again. A problem in phase 1 is that during bootup data structures can be initialized, e.g. on module load time, and thus access a weakly seeded prandom and are never changed for the rest of their live-time, thus carrying along the results from a week seed. Lets make sure that current but also future users access a possibly better early seeded prandom. This patch therefore improves phase 1 by trying to make it more 'unpredictable' through mixing in seed from a possible hardware source. Now, the mix-in xors inner state with the outcome of either of the two functions arch_get_random_{,seed}_int(), preferably arch_get_random_seed_int() as it likely represents a non-deterministic random bit generator in hw rather than a cryptographically secure PRNG in hw. However, not all might have the first one, so we use the PRNG as a fallback if available. As we xor the seed into the current state, the worst case would be that a hardware source could be unverifiable compromised or backdoored. In that case nevertheless it would be as good as our original early seeding function prandom_seed_very_weak() since we mix through xor which is entropy preserving. Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* lib/random32.c: minor cleanups and kdoc fixDaniel Borkmann2016-09-101-37/+39
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These are just some very minor and misc cleanups in the PRNG. In prandom_u32() we store the result in an unsigned long which is unnecessary as it should be u32 instead that we get from prandom_u32_state(). prandom_bytes_state()'s comment is in kdoc format, so change it into such as it's done everywhere else. Also, use the normal comment style for the header comment. Last but not least for readability, add some newlines. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* random32: avoid attempt to late reseed if in the middle of seedingSasha Levin2016-09-101-1/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 4af712e8df ("random32: add prandom_reseed_late() and call when nonblocking pool becomes initialized") has added a late reseed stage that happens as soon as the nonblocking pool is marked as initialized. This fails in the case that the nonblocking pool gets initialized during __prandom_reseed()'s call to get_random_bytes(). In that case we'd double back into __prandom_reseed() in an attempt to do a late reseed - deadlocking on 'lock' early on in the boot process. Instead, just avoid even waiting to do a reseed if a reseed is already occuring. Fixes: 4af712e8df99 ("random32: add prandom_reseed_late() and call when nonblocking pool becomes initialized") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* random32: use msecs_to_jiffies for reseed timerDaniel Borkmann2016-09-101-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | Use msecs_to_jiffies, for these calculations as different HZ considerations are taken into account for conversion of the timer shot, and also it makes the code more readable. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* random32: add __init prefix to prandom_start_seed_timerDaniel Borkmann2016-09-101-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | We only call that in functions annotated with __init, so add __init prefix in prandom_start_seed_timer() as well, so that the kernel can make use of this hint and we can possibly free up resources after it's usage. And since it's an internal function rename it to __prandom_start_seed_timer(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* random32: add test cases for taus113 implementationDaniel Borkmann2016-09-102-6/+196
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We generated a battery of 100 test cases from GSL taus113 implemention and compare the results from a particular seed and a particular iteration with our implementation in the kernel. We have verified on 32 and 64 bit machines that our taus113 kernel implementation gives same results as GSL taus113 implementation: [ 0.147370] prandom: seed boundary self test passed [ 0.148078] prandom: 100 self tests passed This is a Kconfig option that is disabled on default, just like the crc32 init selftests in order to not unnecessary slow down boot process. We also refactored out prandom_seed_very_weak() as it's now used in multiple places in order to reduce redundant code. GSL code we used for generating test cases: int i, j; srand(time(NULL)); for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) { int iteration = 500 + (rand() % 500); gsl_rng_default_seed = rand() + 1; gsl_rng *r = gsl_rng_alloc(gsl_rng_taus113); printf("\t{ %lu, ", gsl_rng_default_seed); for (j = 0; j < iteration - 1; ++j) gsl_rng_get(r); printf("%u, %lu },\n", iteration, gsl_rng_get(r)); gsl_rng_free(r); } Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* random32: upgrade taus88 generator to taus113 from errata paperDaniel Borkmann2016-09-102-39/+52
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since we use prandom*() functions quite often in networking code i.e. in UDP port selection, netfilter code, etc, upgrade the PRNG from Pierre L'Ecuyer's original paper "Maximally Equidistributed Combined Tausworthe Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 65, 213 (1996), 203--213 to the version published in his errata paper [1]. The Tausworthe generator is a maximally-equidistributed generator, that is fast and has good statistical properties [1]. The version presented there upgrades the 3 state LFSR to a 4 state LFSR with increased periodicity from about 2^88 to 2^113. The algorithm is presented in [1] by the very same author who also designed the original algorithm in [2]. Also, by increasing the state, we make it a bit harder for attackers to "guess" the PRNGs internal state. See also discussion in [3]. Now, as we use this sort of weak initialization discussed in [3] only between core_initcall() until late_initcall() time [*] for prandom32*() users, namely in prandom_init(), it is less relevant from late_initcall() onwards as we overwrite seeds through prandom_reseed() anyways with a seed source of higher entropy, that is, get_random_bytes(). In other words, a exhaustive keysearch of 96 bit would be needed. Now, with the help of this patch, this state-search increases further to 128 bit. Initialization needs to make sure that s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15, s4 > 127. taus88 and taus113 algorithm is also part of GSL. I added a test case in the next patch to verify internal behaviour of this patch with GSL and ran tests with the dieharder 3.31.1 RNG test suite: $ dieharder -g 052 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus88 $ dieharder -g 054 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus113 With this seed configuration, in order to compare both, we get the following differences: algorithm taus88 taus113 rands/second [**] 1.61e+08 1.37e+08 sts_serial(4, 1st run) WEAK PASSED sts_serial(9, 2nd run) WEAK PASSED rgb_lagged_sum(31) WEAK PASSED We took out diehard_sums test as according to the authors it is considered broken and unusable [4]. Despite that and the slight decrease in performance (which is acceptable), taus113 here passes all 113 tests (only rgb_minimum_distance_5 in WEAK, the rest PASSED). In general, taus/taus113 is considered "very good" by the authors of dieharder [5]. The papers [1][2] states a single warm-up step is sufficient by running quicktaus once on each state to ensure proper initialization of ~s_{0}: Our selection of (s) according to Table 1 of [1] row 1 holds the condition L - k <= r - s, that is, (32 32 32 32) - (31 29 28 25) <= (25 27 15 22) - (18 2 7 13) with r = k - q and q = (6 2 13 3) as also stated by the paper. So according to [2] we are safe with one round of quicktaus for initialization. However we decided to include the warm-up phase of the PRNG as done in GSL in every case as a safety net. We also use the warm up phase to make the output of the RNG easier to verify by the GSL output. In prandom_init(), we also mix random_get_entropy() into it, just like drivers/char/random.c does it, jiffies ^ random_get_entropy(). random-get_entropy() is get_cycles(). xor is entropy preserving so it is fine if it is not implemented by some architectures. Note, this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel, but rather as a fast PRNG for various randomizations i.e. in the networking code, or elsewhere for debugging purposes, for example. [*]: In order to generate some "sort of pseduo-randomness", since get_random_bytes() is not yet available for us, we use jiffies and initialize states s1 - s3 with a simple linear congruential generator (LCG), that is x <- x * 69069; and derive s2, s3, from the 32bit initialization from s1. So the above quote from [3] accounts only for the time from core to late initcall, not afterwards. [**] Single threaded run on MacBook Air w/ Intel Core i5-3317U [1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps [2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps [3] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/12103/ [4] http://code.google.com/p/dieharder/source/browse/trunk/libdieharder/diehard_sums.c?spec=svn490&r=490#20 [5] http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder.php Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* random32: move rnd_state to linux/random.hDaniel Borkmann2016-09-102-7/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | struct rnd_state got mistakenly pulled into uapi header. It is not used anywhere and does also not belong there! Commit 5960164fde ("lib/random32: export pseudo-random number generator for modules"), the last commit on rnd_state before it got moved to uapi, says: This patch moves the definition of struct rnd_state and the inline __seed() function to linux/random.h. It renames the static __random32() function to prandom32() and exports it for use in modules. Hence, the structure was moved from lib/random32.c to linux/random.h so that it can be used within modules (FCoE-related code in this case), but not from user space. However, it seems to have been mistakenly moved to uapi header through the uapi script. Since no-one should make use of it from the linux headers, move the structure back to the kernel for internal use, so that it can be modified on demand. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Cc: Joe Eykholt <jeykholt@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* random32: add prandom_reseed_late() and call when nonblocking pool becomes ↵Hannes Frederic Sowa2016-09-103-2/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | initialized The Tausworthe PRNG is initialized at late_initcall time. At that time the entropy pool serving get_random_bytes is not filled sufficiently. This patch adds an additional reseeding step as soon as the nonblocking pool gets marked as initialized. On some machines it might be possible that late_initcall gets called after the pool has been initialized. In this situation we won't reseed again. (A call to prandom_seed_late blocks later invocations of early reseed attempts.) Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* random32: add periodic reseedingHannes Frederic Sowa2016-09-101-0/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current Tausworthe PRNG is never reseeded with truly random data after the first attempt in late_initcall. As this PRNG is used for some critical random data as e.g. UDP port randomization we should try better and reseed the PRNG once in a while with truly random data from get_random_bytes(). When we reseed with prandom_seed we now make also sure to throw the first output away. This suffices the reseeding procedure. The delay calculation is based on a proposal from Eric Dumazet. Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* char: frandom: initial commit v1.1imoseyon2016-09-102-1/+416
| | | | | | | Based on my dd test: hw_random (msm_rng): 0.56 MB/s linux random/urandom: 4.4 MB/s frandom/erandom: 90 MB/s
* random: remove warningimoseyon2016-09-101-2/+0
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* random: prevent add_input from doing anythingimoseyon2016-09-101-10/+1
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* random: entropy tweaks are all the rage nowadaysimoseyon2016-09-101-52/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | use non-blocking pool for all http://lwn.net/Articles/489734/ Conflicts: drivers/char/random.c Conflicts: drivers/char/random.c
* Input: optimize events_per_packet count calculationAnshul Garg2016-09-101-9/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch avoids unnecessary operations while estimating events per packet for an input device when event type is not set. Change-Id: I913be1e5356d5ca7d3047e6b0413069993c2921c Signed-off-by: Anshul Garg <anshul.g@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Git-commit: baf332c0f1cede26e9c2af6276b36b4c3a36e34a Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git Signed-off-by: Matt Wagantall <mattw@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
* mmc: core: With great features come great spamPranav Vashi2016-09-101-2/+2
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: engstk <eng.stk@sapo.pt>
* fs/namei.c: fix potential memory leak in path_lookupatimoseyon2016-09-101-1/+2
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* tools/include: use stdint types for user-space byteshift headersYaakov Selkowitz2016-09-102-34/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | Commit a07f7672d7cf0ff0d6e548a9feb6e0bd016d9c6c added user-space copies of the byteshift headers to be used by hostprogs, changing e.g. u8 to __u8. However, in order to cross-compile the kernel from a non-Linux system, stdint.h types need to be used instead of linux/types.h types. Change-Id: I72632acb8fd44d671098c4e680c99fa76b214b27 Signed-off-by: Yaakov Selkowitz <yselkowitz@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
* fs: Workaround the compiler's bad optimizationNikhilesh Reddy2016-09-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | When compiling the kernel with the compiler "aarch64-linux-android-gcc (GCC) 4.9.x-google 20140827 (prerelease)" The compiler seems to be optimizing a value out in the do_sync_write function and is incorrectly passing the pointer instead of the dereferenced value. Force the compiler to use the right value by passing the dereferenced pointer instead of another variable that is assigned with the dereferenced value. Change-Id: I60505ffe39393f6323dcc7c6f912c74ea6aca6cd Signed-off-by: Nikhilesh Reddy <reddyn@codeaurora.org>
* X.509: silence asn1 compiler debug outputArnd Bergmann2016-09-101-11/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | The asn1_compiler process is particularly chatty and produces about the only stdout output for an allmodconfig kernel. In order to follow the general concept of 'no news is good news' for building kernels, this hides all the existing output unless the KBUILD_VERBOSE environment variable is set. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* arm64: Fix the ARM userspace buildSteve Kondik2016-09-102-0/+4
| | | | | | | | * __uint128_t is not defined on 32-bit. Change-Id: I3447a95810f67b2af79f4ed476af96d8c279d2f7 Signed-off-by: Peter Nyilas <peter.nyilas@byyd-tech.com>
* regen defconfigMoyster2016-09-101-23/+26
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* defconfigMoyster2016-09-101-2/+5
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* 3.10.102-> 3.10.103Jan Engelmohr2016-09-10160-1285/+1792
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* add DEFAULT_ZENJan Engelmohr2016-09-101-0/+3
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* fix conflictMoyster2016-09-101-22/+0
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* 4cf01a4781fad322241f9f0f1b5901a1b9919e18Lorenzo Ori2016-09-101-15/+1
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* block: sioplus: set fifo batch to 16 to reduce overload on eMMC and CPU.DespairFactor2016-09-101-1/+1
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* block: sioplus Linux 3.10 compatibility updateripng2016-09-101-7/+17
| | | | Signed-off by: Matthew Alex <matthewalex@outlook.com>
* block: scheduler: add SIOPLUSdespairfactor2016-09-104-1/+447
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* Zen Sched: set fifo batch to 16 to reduce overload on eMMC and CPUscafroglia932016-09-101-1/+1
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* block: scheduler: add ZEN v2anarkia19762016-09-101-14/+14
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* block: zen crashing on selection fixupripng2016-09-101-15/+25
| | | | Signed-off by: Matthew Alex <matthewalex@outlook.com>
* block: add zen schedulerripng2016-09-103-0/+289
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* use -O3 compile flagsMoyster2016-09-101-2/+2
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* defconfig updateMoyster2016-09-101-7/+7
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