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* usb: renesas_usbhs: fix clearing the {BRDY,BEMP}STS conditionYoshihiro Shimoda2017-04-111-2/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 519d8bd4b5d3d82c413eac5bb42b106bb4b9ec15 upstream. The previous driver is possible to stop the transfer wrongly. For example: 1) An interrupt happens, but not BRDY interruption. 2) Read INTSTS0. And than state->intsts0 is not set to BRDY. 3) BRDY is set to 1 here. 4) Read BRDYSTS. 5) Clear the BRDYSTS. And then. the BRDY is cleared wrongly. Remarks: - The INTSTS0.BRDY is read only. - If any bits of BRDYSTS are set to 1, the BRDY is set to 1. - If BRDYSTS is 0, the BRDY is set to 0. So, this patch adds condition to avoid such situation. (And about NRDYSTS, this is not used for now. But, avoiding any side effects, this patch doesn't touch it.) Fixes: d5c6a1e024dd ("usb: renesas_usbhs: fixup interrupt status clear method") Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* USB: serial: mos7840: fix non-atomic allocation in write pathAlexey Khoroshilov2017-04-111-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3b7c7e52efda0d4640060de747768360ba70a7c0 upstream. There is an allocation with GFP_KERNEL flag in mos7840_write(), while it may be called from interrupt context. Follow-up for commit 191252837626 ("USB: kobil_sct: fix non-atomic allocation in write path") Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org). Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* USB: serial: mos7720: fix non-atomic allocation in write pathAlexey Khoroshilov2017-04-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 5a5a1d614287a647b36dff3f40c2b0ceabbc83ec upstream. There is an allocation with GFP_KERNEL flag in mos7720_write(), while it may be called from interrupt context. Follow-up for commit 191252837626 ("USB: kobil_sct: fix non-atomic allocation in write path") Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org). Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* USB: kobil_sct: fix non-atomic allocation in write pathJohan Hovold2017-04-111-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | commit 191252837626fca0de694c18bb2aa64c118eda89 upstream Write may be called from interrupt context so make sure to use GFP_ATOMIC for all allocations in write. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* USB: serial: fix memleak in driver-registration error pathAlexey Klimov2017-04-111-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 647024a7df36014bbc4479d92d88e6b77c0afcf6 upstream. udriver struct allocated by kzalloc() will not be freed if usb_register() and next calls fail. This patch fixes this by adding one more step with kfree(udriver) in error path. Signed-off-by: Alexey Klimov <klimov.linux@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* usb: xhci: Fix panic if disconnectJim Lin2017-04-111-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 88716a93766b8f095cdef37a8e8f2c93aa233b21 upstream. After a device is disconnected, xhci_stop_device() will be invoked in xhci_bus_suspend(). Also the "disconnect" IRQ will have ISR to invoke xhci_free_virt_device() in this sequence. xhci_irq -> xhci_handle_event -> handle_cmd_completion -> xhci_handle_cmd_disable_slot -> xhci_free_virt_device If xhci->devs[slot_id] has been assigned to NULL in xhci_free_virt_device(), then virt_dev->eps[i].ring in xhci_stop_device() may point to an invlid address to cause kernel panic. virt_dev = xhci->devs[slot_id]; : if (virt_dev->eps[i].ring && virt_dev->eps[i].ring->dequeue) [] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00001a68 [] pgd=ffffffc001430000 [] [00001a68] *pgd=000000013c807003, *pud=000000013c807003, *pmd=000000013c808003, *pte=0000000000000000 [] Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [] CPU: 0 PID: 39 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G U [] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work [] task: ffffffc0bc0e0bc0 ti: ffffffc0bc0ec000 task.ti: ffffffc0bc0ec000 [] PC is at xhci_stop_device.constprop.11+0xb4/0x1a4 This issue is found when running with realtek ethernet device (0bda:8153). Signed-off-by: Jim Lin <jilin@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* USB: fix typo in wMaxPacketSize validationAlan Stern2017-04-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | commit 6c73358c83ce870c0cf32413e5cadb3b9a39c606 upstream. The maximum value allowed for wMaxPacketSize of a high-speed interrupt endpoint is 1024 bytes, not 1023. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Fixes: aed9d65ac327 ("USB: validate wMaxPacketValue entries in endpoint descriptors") Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* USB: validate wMaxPacketValue entries in endpoint descriptorsAlan Stern2017-04-111-3/+62
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit aed9d65ac3278d4febd8665bd7db59ef53e825fe upstream. Erroneous or malicious endpoint descriptors may have non-zero bits in reserved positions, or out-of-bounds values. This patch helps prevent these from causing problems by bounds-checking the wMaxPacketValue entries in endpoint descriptors and capping the values at the maximum allowed. This issue was first discovered and tests were conducted by Jake Lamberson <jake.lamberson1@gmail.com>, an intern working for Rosie Hall. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Reported-by: roswest <roswest@cisco.com> Tested-by: roswest <roswest@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [wt: adjusted to 3.10 -- no USB_SPEED_SUPER_PLUS] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* usb: dwc3: gadget: increment request->actual onceFelipe Balbi2017-04-111-8/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c7de573471832dff7d31f0c13b0f143d6f017799 upstream. When using SG lists, we would end up setting request->actual to: num_mapped_sgs * (request->length - count) Let's fix that up by incrementing request->actual only once. Reported-by: Brian E Rogers <brian.e.rogers@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* coredump: fix unfreezable coredumping taskAndrey Ryabinin2017-04-111-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 70d78fe7c8b640b5acfad56ad341985b3810998a upstream. It could be not possible to freeze coredumping task when it waits for 'core_state->startup' completion, because threads are frozen in get_signal() before they got a chance to complete 'core_state->startup'. Inability to freeze a task during suspend will cause suspend to fail. Also CRIU uses cgroup freezer during dump operation. So with an unfreezable task the CRIU dump will fail because it waits for a transition from 'FREEZING' to 'FROZEN' state which will never happen. Use freezer_do_not_count() to tell freezer to ignore coredumping task while it waits for core_state->startup completion. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1475225434-3753-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* swapfile: fix memory corruption via malformed swapfileJann Horn2017-04-111-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit dd111be69114cc867f8e826284559bfbc1c40e37 upstream. When root activates a swap partition whose header has the wrong endianness, nr_badpages elements of badpages are swabbed before nr_badpages has been checked, leading to a buffer overrun of up to 8GB. This normally is not a security issue because it can only be exploited by root (more specifically, a process with CAP_SYS_ADMIN or the ability to modify a swap file/partition), and such a process can already e.g. modify swapped-out memory of any other userspace process on the system. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1477949533-2509-1-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* Fix potential infoleak in older kernelsLinus Torvalds2017-04-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Not upstream as it is not needed there. So a patch something like this might be a safe way to fix the potential infoleak in older kernels. THIS IS UNTESTED. It's a very obvious patch, though, so if it compiles it probably works. It just initializes the output variable with 0 in the inline asm description, instead of doing it in the exception handler. It will generate slightly worse code (a few unnecessary ALU operations), but it doesn't have any interactions with the exception handler implementation. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* arc: don't leak bits of kernel stack into coredumpAl Viro2017-04-111-5/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 7798bf2140ebcc36eafec6a4194fffd8d585d471 upstream. On faulting sigreturn we do get SIGSEGV, all right, but anything we'd put into pt_regs could end up in the coredump. And since __copy_from_user() never zeroed on arc, we'd better bugger off on its failure without copying random uninitialized bits of kernel stack into pt_regs... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* fix fault_in_multipages_...() on architectures with no-op access_ok()Al Viro2017-04-111-19/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e23d4159b109167126e5bcd7f3775c95de7fee47 upstream. Switching iov_iter fault-in to multipages variants has exposed an old bug in underlying fault_in_multipages_...(); they break if the range passed to them wraps around. Normally access_ok() done by callers will prevent such (and it's a guaranteed EFAULT - ERR_PTR() values fall into such a range and they should not point to any valid objects). However, on architectures where userland and kernel live in different MMU contexts (e.g. s390) access_ok() is a no-op and on those a range with a wraparound can reach fault_in_multipages_...(). Since any wraparound means EFAULT there, the fix is trivial - turn those while (uaddr <= end) ... into if (unlikely(uaddr > end)) return -EFAULT; do ... while (uaddr <= end); Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* ia64: copy_from_user() should zero the destination on access_ok() failureAl Viro2017-04-111-11/+9
| | | | | | | commit a5e541f796f17228793694d64b507f5f57db4cd7 upstream. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* ppc32: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro2017-04-111-19/+2
| | | | | | | | | | commit 224264657b8b228f949b42346e09ed8c90136a8e upstream. should clear on access_ok() failures. Also remove the useless range truncation logics. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* sparc32: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro2017-04-111-1/+3
| | | | | | | | commit 917400cecb4b52b5cde5417348322bb9c8272fa6 upstream. Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* mn10300: copy_from_user() should zero on access_ok() failure...Al Viro2017-04-111-1/+3
| | | | | | | commit ae7cc577ec2a4a6151c9e928fd1f595d953ecef1 upstream. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* openrisc: fix the fix of copy_from_user()Guenter Roeck2017-04-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 8e4b72054f554967827e18be1de0e8122e6efc04 upstream. Since commit acb2505d0119 ("openrisc: fix copy_from_user()"), copy_from_user() returns the number of bytes requested, not the number of bytes not copied. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Fixes: acb2505d0119 ("openrisc: fix copy_from_user()") Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* openrisc: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro2017-04-111-24/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit acb2505d0119033a80c85ac8d02dccae41271667 upstream. ... that should zero on faults. Also remove the <censored> helpful logics wrt range truncation copied from ppc32. Where it had ever been needed only in case of copy_from_user() *and* had not been merged into the mainline until a month after the need had disappeared. A decade before openrisc went into mainline, I might add... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* parisc: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro2017-04-111-2/+5
| | | | | | | commit aace880feea38875fbc919761b77e5732a3659ef upstream. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* metag: copy_from_user() should zero the destination on access_ok() failureAl Viro2017-04-111-1/+2
| | | | | | | | commit 8ae95ed4ae5fc7c3391ed668b2014c9e2079533b upstream. Acked-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* alpha: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro2017-04-111-11/+8
| | | | | | | | | commit 2561d309dfd1555e781484af757ed0115035ddb3 upstream. it should clear the destination even when access_ok() fails. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* asm-generic: make copy_from_user() zero the destination properlyAl Viro2017-04-111-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2545e5da080b4839dd859e3b09343a884f6ab0e3 upstream. ... in all cases, including the failing access_ok() Note that some architectures using asm-generic/uaccess.h have __copy_from_user() not zeroing the tail on failure halfway through. This variant works either way. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> [wt: s/might_fault/might_sleep] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* mips: copy_from_user() must zero the destination on access_ok() failureAl Viro2017-04-111-0/+3
| | | | | | | commit e69d700535ac43a18032b3c399c69bf4639e89a2 upstream. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* hexagon: fix strncpy_from_user() error returnAl Viro2017-04-111-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | commit f35c1e0671728d1c9abc405d05ef548b5fcb2fc4 upstream. It's -EFAULT, not -1 (and contrary to the comment in there, __strnlen_user() can return 0 - on faults). Acked-by: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* sh: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro2017-04-111-1/+4
| | | | | | | commit 6e050503a150b2126620c1a1e9b3a368fcd51eac upstream. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* score: fix copy_from_user() and friendsAl Viro2017-04-111-21/+20
| | | | | | | commit b615e3c74621e06cd97f86373ca90d43d6d998aa upstream. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* blackfin: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro2017-04-111-4/+5
| | | | | | | commit 8f035983dd826d7e04f67b28acf8e2f08c347e41 upstream. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* cris: buggered copy_from_user/copy_to_user/clear_userAl Viro2017-04-111-39/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | commit eb47e0293baaa3044022059f1fa9ff474bfe35cb upstream. * copy_from_user() on access_ok() failure ought to zero the destination * none of those primitives should skip the access_ok() check in case of small constant size. Acked-by: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* frv: fix clear_user()Al Viro2017-04-111-3/+9
| | | | | | | | | | commit 3b8767a8f00cc6538ba6b1cf0f88502e2fd2eb90 upstream. It should check access_ok(). Otherwise a bunch of places turn into trivially exploitable rootholes. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* asm-generic: make get_user() clear the destination on errorsAl Viro2017-04-111-3/+7
| | | | | | | | | commit 9ad18b75c2f6e4a78ce204e79f37781f8815c0fa upstream. both for access_ok() failures and for faults halfway through Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* ARC: uaccess: get_user to zero out dest in cause of faultVineet Gupta2017-04-111-2/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 05d9d0b96e53c52a113fd783c0c97c830c8dc7af upstream. Al reported potential issue with ARC get_user() as it wasn't clearing out destination pointer in case of fault due to bad address etc. Verified using following | { | u32 bogus1 = 0xdeadbeef; | u64 bogus2 = 0xdead; | int rc1, rc2; | | pr_info("Orig values %x %llx\n", bogus1, bogus2); | rc1 = get_user(bogus1, (u32 __user *)0x40000000); | rc2 = get_user(bogus2, (u64 __user *)0x50000000); | pr_info("access %d %d, new values %x %llx\n", | rc1, rc2, bogus1, bogus2); | } | [ARCLinux]# insmod /mnt/kernel-module/qtn.ko | Orig values deadbeef dead | access -14 -14, new values 0 0 Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* s390: get_user() should zero on failureAl Viro2017-04-111-4/+4
| | | | | | | commit fd2d2b191fe75825c4c7a6f12f3fef35aaed7dd7 upstream. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* score: fix __get_user/get_userAl Viro2017-04-111-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | commit c2f18fa4cbb3ad92e033a24efa27583978ce9600 upstream. * should zero on any failure * __get_user() should use __copy_from_user(), not copy_from_user() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* sh64: failing __get_user() should zeroAl Viro2017-04-111-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | commit c6852389228df9fb3067f94f3b651de2a7921b36 upstream. It could be done in exception-handling bits in __get_user_b() et.al., but the surgery involved would take more knowledge of sh64 details than I have or _want_ to have. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* m32r: fix __get_user()Al Viro2017-04-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | commit c90a3bc5061d57e7931a9b7ad14784e1a0ed497d upstream. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* mn10300: failing __get_user() and get_user() should zeroAl Viro2017-04-111-0/+1
| | | | | | | commit 43403eabf558d2800b429cd886e996fd555aa542 upstream. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* microblaze: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro2017-04-111-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | commit d0cf385160c12abd109746cad1f13e3b3e8b50b8 upstream. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> [wt: s/might_fault/might_sleep] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* microblaze: fix __get_user()Al Viro2017-04-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | commit e98b9e37ae04562d52c96f46b3cf4c2e80222dc1 upstream. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* parisc: Ensure consistent state when switching to kernel stack at syscall entryJohn David Anglin2017-04-111-2/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 6ed518328d0189e0fdf1bb7c73290d546143ea66 upstream. We have one critical section in the syscall entry path in which we switch from the userspace stack to kernel stack. In the event of an external interrupt, the interrupt code distinguishes between those two states by analyzing the value of sr7. If sr7 is zero, it uses the kernel stack. Therefore it's important, that the value of sr7 is in sync with the currently enabled stack. This patch now disables interrupts while executing the critical section. This prevents the interrupt handler to possibly see an inconsistent state which in the worst case can lead to crashes. Interestingly, in the syscall exit path interrupts were already disabled in the critical section which switches back to the userspace stack. Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net> Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* s390/dasd: fix hanging device after clear subchannelStefan Haberland2017-04-111-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 9ba333dc55cbb9523553df973adb3024d223e905 upstream. When a device is in a status where CIO has killed all I/O by itself the interrupt for a clear request may not contain an irb to determine the clear function. Instead it contains an error pointer -EIO. This was ignored by the DASD int_handler leading to a hanging device waiting for a clear interrupt. Handle -EIO error pointer correctly for requests that are clear pending and treat the clear as successful. Signed-off-by: Stefan Haberland <sth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Ott <sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* avr32: off by one in at32_init_pio()Dan Carpenter2017-04-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | commit 55f1cf83d5cf885c75267269729805852039c834 upstream. The pio_dev[] array has MAX_NR_PIO_DEVICES elements so the > should be >=. Fixes: 5f97f7f9400d ('[PATCH] avr32 architecture') Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* avr32: fix 'undefined reference to `___copy_from_user'Guenter Roeck2017-04-111-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 65c0044ca8d7c7bbccae37f0ff2972f0210e9f41 upstream. avr32 builds fail with: arch/avr32/kernel/built-in.o: In function `arch_ptrace': (.text+0x650): undefined reference to `___copy_from_user' arch/avr32/kernel/built-in.o:(___ksymtab+___copy_from_user+0x0): undefined reference to `___copy_from_user' kernel/built-in.o: In function `proc_doulongvec_ms_jiffies_minmax': (.text+0x5dd8): undefined reference to `___copy_from_user' kernel/built-in.o: In function `proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin': sysctl.c:(.text+0x6174): undefined reference to `___copy_from_user' kernel/built-in.o: In function `ptrace_has_cap': ptrace.c:(.text+0x69c0): undefined reference to `___copy_from_user' kernel/built-in.o:ptrace.c:(.text+0x6b90): more undefined references to `___copy_from_user' follow Fixes: 8630c32275ba ("avr32: fix copy_from_user()") Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Havard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com> Acked-by: Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* avr32: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro2017-04-113-4/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | commit 8630c32275bac2de6ffb8aea9d9b11663e7ad28e upstream. really ugly, but apparently avr32 compilers turns access_ok() into something so bad that they want it in assembler. Left that way, zeroing added in inline wrapper. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* powerpc/nvram: Fix an incorrect partition mergePan Xinhui2017-04-111-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 11b7e154b132232535befe51c55db048069c8461 upstream. When we merge two contiguous partitions whose signatures are marked NVRAM_SIG_FREE, We need update prev's length and checksum, then write it to nvram, not cur's. So lets fix this mistake now. Also use memset instead of strncpy to set the partition's name. It's more readable if we want to fill up with duplicate chars . Fixes: fa2b4e54d41f ("powerpc/nvram: Improve partition removal") Signed-off-by: Pan Xinhui <xinhui.pan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* powerpc/64: Fix incorrect return value from __copy_tofrom_userPaul Mackerras2017-04-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 1a34439e5a0b2235e43f96816dbb15ee1154f656 upstream. Debugging a data corruption issue with virtio-net/vhost-net led to the observation that __copy_tofrom_user was occasionally returning a value 16 larger than it should. Since the return value from __copy_tofrom_user is the number of bytes not copied, this means that __copy_tofrom_user can occasionally return a value larger than the number of bytes it was asked to copy. In turn this can cause higher-level copy functions such as copy_page_to_iter_iovec to corrupt memory by copying data into the wrong memory locations. It turns out that the failing case involves a fault on the store at label 79, and at that point the first unmodified byte of the destination is at R3 + 16. Consequently the exception handler for that store needs to add 16 to R3 before using it to work out how many bytes were not copied, but in this one case it was not adding the offset to R3. To fix it, this moves the label 179 to the point where we add 16 to R3. I have checked manually all the exception handlers for the loads and stores in this code and the rest of them are correct (it would be excellent to have an automated test of all the exception cases). This bug has been present since this code was initially committed in May 2002 to Linux version 2.5.20. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* powerpc/powernv: Use CPU-endian PEST in pnv_pci_dump_p7ioc_diag_data()Gavin Shan2017-04-111-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 5adaf8629b193f185ca5a1665b9e777a0579f518 upstream. This fixes the warnings reported from sparse: pci.c:312:33: warning: restricted __be64 degrades to integer pci.c:313:33: warning: restricted __be64 degrades to integer Fixes: cee72d5bb489 ("powerpc/powernv: Display diag data on p7ioc EEH errors") Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* powerpc/vdso64: Use double word compare on pointersAnton Blanchard2017-04-112-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 5045ea37377ce8cca6890d32b127ad6770e6dce5 upstream. __kernel_get_syscall_map() and __kernel_clock_getres() use cmpli to check if the passed in pointer is non zero. cmpli maps to a 32 bit compare on binutils, so we ignore the top 32 bits. A simple test case can be created by passing in a bogus pointer with the bottom 32 bits clear. Using a clk_id that is handled by the VDSO, then one that is handled by the kernel shows the problem: printf("%d\n", clock_getres(CLOCK_REALTIME, (void *)0x100000000)); printf("%d\n", clock_getres(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, (void *)0x100000000)); And we get: 0 -1 The bigger issue is if we pass a valid pointer with the bottom 32 bits clear, in this case we will return success but won't write any data to the pointer. I stumbled across this issue because the LLVM integrated assembler doesn't accept cmpli with 3 arguments. Fix this by converting them to cmpldi. Fixes: a7f290dad32e ("[PATCH] powerpc: Merge vdso's and add vdso support to 32 bits kernel") Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* powerpc/mm: Don't alias user region to other regions below PAGE_OFFSETPaul Mackerras2017-04-111-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f077aaf0754bcba0fffdbd925bc12f09cd1e38aa upstream. In commit c60ac5693c47 ("powerpc: Update kernel VSID range", 2013-03-13) we lost a check on the region number (the top four bits of the effective address) for addresses below PAGE_OFFSET. That commit replaced a check that the top 18 bits were all zero with a check that bits 46 - 59 were zero (performed for all addresses, not just user addresses). This means that userspace can access an address like 0x1000_0xxx_xxxx_xxxx and we will insert a valid SLB entry for it. The VSID used will be the same as if the top 4 bits were 0, but the page size will be some random value obtained by indexing beyond the end of the mm_ctx_high_slices_psize array in the paca. If that page size is the same as would be used for region 0, then userspace just has an alias of the region 0 space. If the page size is different, then no HPTE will be found for the access, and the process will get a SIGSEGV (since hash_page_mm() will refuse to create a HPTE for the bogus address). The access beyond the end of the mm_ctx_high_slices_psize can be at most 5.5MB past the array, and so will be in RAM somewhere. Since the access is a load performed in real mode, it won't fault or crash the kernel. At most this bug could perhaps leak a little bit of information about blocks of 32 bytes of memory located at offsets of i * 512kB past the paca->mm_ctx_high_slices_psize array, for 1 <= i <= 11. Fixes: c60ac5693c47 ("powerpc: Update kernel VSID range") Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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