aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* block: fiops add ioprio supportShaohua Li2016-09-131-12/+93
| | | | | | | | Add CFQ-like ioprio support. Priority A will get 20% more share than priority A+1, which matches CFQ. Change-Id: I0d6f145810e3f0979440063c030cddf30ad4179c Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shaohua.li@intel.com>
* block: fiops sync/async scaleShaohua Li2016-09-131-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CFQ gives 2.5 times more share to sync workload. This matches CFQ. Note this is different with the read/write scale. We have 3 types of requests: 1. read 2. sync write 3. write CFQ doesn't differentitate type 1 and 2, but request cost of 1 and 2 are usually different for flash based storage. So we have both sync/async and read/write scale here. Change-Id: I3b36c94ba63df6d7a823c941a34a479da6243f20 Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shaohua.li@intel.com>
* block: fiops read/write request scaleShaohua Li2016-09-131-1/+70
| | | | | | | | | | | | read/write speed of Flash based storage usually is different. For example, in my SSD maxium thoughput of read is about 3 times faster than that of write. Add a scale to differenate read and write. Also add a tunable, so user can assign different scale for read and write. By default, the scale is 1:1, which means the scale is a noop. Change-Id: Ic223e96d1c72591ef535307755d78ff33dbc6939 Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shaohua.li@intel.com>
* block: fiops ioscheduler coreShaohua Li2016-09-133-0/+568
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | FIOPS (Fair IOPS) ioscheduler is IOPS based ioscheduler, so only targets for drive without I/O seek. It's quite similar like CFQ, but the dispatch decision is made according to IOPS instead of slice. The algorithm is simple. Drive has a service tree, and each task lives in the tree. The key into the tree is called vios (virtual I/O). Every request has vios, which is calculated according to its ioprio, request size and so on. Task's vios is the sum of vios of all requests it dispatches. FIOPS always selects task with minimum vios in the service tree and let the task dispatch request. The dispatched request's vios is then added to the task's vios and the task is repositioned in the sevice tree. Unlike CFQ, FIOPS doesn't have separate sync/async queues, because with I/O less writeback, usually a task can only dispatch either sync or async requests. Bias read or write request can still be done with read/write scale. One issue is if workload iodepth is lower than drive queue_depth, IOPS share of a task might not be strictly according to its priority, request Bias read or write request can still be done with read/write scale. One issue is if workload iodepth is lower than drive queue_depth, IOPS share of a task might not be strictly according to its priority, request size and so on. In this case, the drive is in idle actually. Solving the problem need make drive idle, so impact performance. I believe CFQ isn't completely fair between tasks in such case too. Change-Id: I1f86b964ada1e06ac979899ca05f1082d0d8228d Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shaohua.li@intel.com>
* less debugMoyster2016-09-111-1/+1
|
* defconfig: enable CONFIG_INET_DIAG_DESTROYMoyster2016-09-111-0/+1
|
* Update README.mdMoyster2016-09-101-1/+1
|
* selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore filesStephen Smalley2016-09-101-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Support per-file labeling of sysfs and pstore files based on genfscon policy entries. This is safe because the sysfs and pstore directory tree cannot be manipulated by userspace, except to unlink pstore entries. This provides an alternative method of assigning per-file labeling to sysfs or pstore files without needing to set the labels from userspace on each boot. The advantages of this approach are that the labels are assigned as soon as the dentry is first instantiated and userspace does not need to walk the sysfs or pstore tree and set the labels on each boot. The limitations of this approach are that the labels can only be assigned based on pathname prefix matching. You can initially assign labels using this mechanism and then change them at runtime via setxattr if allowed to do so by policy. Change-Id: If5999785fdc1d24d869b23ae35cd302311e94562 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Suggested-by: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com>
* selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files.Stephen Smalley2016-09-102-22/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | upstream commit 6f29997f4a3117169eeabd41dbea4c1bd94a739c Add support for per-file labeling of debugfs files so that we can distinguish them in policy. This is particularly important in Android where certain debugfs files have to be writable by apps and therefore the debugfs directory tree can be read and searched by all. Since debugfs is entirely kernel-generated, the directory tree is immutable by userspace, and the inodes are pinned in memory, we can simply use the same approach as with proc and label the inodes from policy based on pathname from the root of the debugfs filesystem. Generalize the existing labeling support used for proc and reuse it for debugfs too. [sds: Back-ported to 3.10. superblock_security_struct flags field is only unsigned char in 3.10 so we have to redefine SE_SBGENFS. However, this definition is kernel-private, not exposed to userspace or stored anywhere persistent.] Change-Id: I6460fbed6bb6bd36eb8554ac8c4fdd574edf3b07 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* security: lsm_audit: add ioctl specific auditingJeff Vander Stoep2016-09-102-0/+22
| | | | | | | | | Add information about ioctl calls to the LSM audit data. Log the file path and command number. Bug: 18087110 Change-Id: Idbbd106db6226683cb30022d9e8f6f3b8fab7f84 Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
* BACKPORT: FROMLIST: arm64: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS.dcashman2016-09-102-3/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (cherry picked from commit https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/12/21/340) arm64: arch_mmap_rnd() uses STACK_RND_MASK to generate the random offset for the mmap base address. This value represents a compromise between increased ASLR effectiveness and avoiding address-space fragmentation. Replace it with a Kconfig option, which is sensibly bounded, so that platform developers may choose where to place this compromise. Keep default values as new minimums. Bug: 24047224 Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com> Change-Id: I7caf105b838cfc3ab55f275e1a061eb2b77c9a2a
* FROMLIST: arm: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS.dcashman2016-09-102-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (cherry picked from commit https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/12/21/341) arm: arch_mmap_rnd() uses a hard-code value of 8 to generate the random offset for the mmap base address. This value represents a compromise between increased ASLR effectiveness and avoiding address-space fragmentation. Replace it with a Kconfig option, which is sensibly bounded, so that platform developers may choose where to place this compromise. Keep 8 as the minimum acceptable value. Bug: 24047224 Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com> Change-Id: I89c23a8737c981116a67381c241fdd5556e2b043
* FROMLIST: mm: mmap: Add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR.dcashman2016-09-105-0/+142
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (cherry picked from commit https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/12/21/337) ASLR only uses as few as 8 bits to generate the random offset for the mmap base address on 32 bit architectures. This value was chosen to prevent a poorly chosen value from dividing the address space in such a way as to prevent large allocations. This may not be an issue on all platforms. Allow the specification of a minimum number of bits so that platforms desiring greater ASLR protection may determine where to place the trade-off. Bug: 24047224 Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com> Change-Id: I66ac01c6f4f2c8dcfc84d1f1e99490b8385b3ed4
* selinux: nlmsgtab: add SOCK_DESTROY to the netlink mapping tablesLorenzo Colitti2016-09-101-3/+4
| | | | | | | | Without this, using SOCK_DESTROY in enforcing mode results in: SELinux: unrecognized netlink message type=21 for sclass=32 Change-Id: I7862bb0fc83573567243ffa9549a2c7405b5986c
* net: diag: support v4mapped sockets in inet_diag_find_one_icsk()Eric Dumazet2016-09-101-6/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Lorenzo reported that we could not properly find v4mapped sockets in inet_diag_find_one_icsk(). This patch fixes the issue. [Cherry-pick of net 7c1306723ee916ea9f1fa7d9e4c7a6d029ca7aaf] Change-Id: If71ddbc2f082e708e5fa9d60f5c08702a09e2884 Reported-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* net: tcp: deal with listen sockets properly in tcp_abort.Lorenzo Colitti2016-09-101-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When closing a listen socket, tcp_abort currently calls tcp_done without clearing the request queue. If the socket has a child socket that is established but not yet accepted, the child socket is then left without a parent, causing a leak. Fix this by setting the socket state to TCP_CLOSE and calling inet_csk_listen_stop with the socket lock held, like tcp_close does. Tested using net_test. With this patch, calling SOCK_DESTROY on a listen socket that has an established but not yet accepted child socket results in the parent and the child being closed, such that they no longer appear in sock_diag dumps. [Backport of net-next 2010b93e9317cc12acd20c4aed385af7f9d1681e] Change-Id: I2b9c38fab194b3c4e11439047ead9582c811d4c2 Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* net: diag: Support destroying TCP sockets.Lorenzo Colitti2016-09-106-0/+68
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This implements SOCK_DESTROY for TCP sockets. It causes all blocking calls on the socket to fail fast with ECONNABORTED and causes a protocol close of the socket. It informs the other end of the connection by sending a RST, i.e., initiating a TCP ABORT as per RFC 793. ECONNABORTED was chosen for consistency with FreeBSD. [Backport of net-next c1e64e298b8cad309091b95d8436a0255c84f54a] Change-Id: Ice9aad37741fe497341d1d2a51e0b70601a99c90 Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* net: diag: Support SOCK_DESTROY for inet sockets.Lorenzo Colitti2016-09-102-8/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This passes the SOCK_DESTROY operation to the underlying protocol diag handler, or returns -EOPNOTSUPP if that handler does not define a destroy operation. Most of this patch is just renaming functions. This is not strictly necessary, but it would be fairly counterintuitive to have the code to destroy inet sockets be in a function whose name starts with inet_diag_get. [Backport of net-next 6eb5d2e08f071c05ecbe135369c9ad418826cab2] Change-Id: Iee2c858bf11c48f54890b85b87821a2a2d7109e1 Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* net: diag: Add the ability to destroy a socket.Lorenzo Colitti2016-09-104-3/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds a SOCK_DESTROY operation, a destroy function pointer to sock_diag_handler, and a diag_destroy function pointer. It does not include any implementation code. [Backport of net-next 64be0aed59ad519d6f2160868734f7e278290ac1] Change-Id: I3db262a7e41f1f8452ff0968d4001234598190d8 Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* net: diag: split inet_diag_dump_one_icsk into twoLorenzo Colitti2016-09-102-14/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, inet_diag_dump_one_icsk finds a socket and then dumps its information to userspace. Split it into a part that finds the socket and a part that dumps the information. [Backport of net-next b613f56ec9baf30edf5d9d607b822532a273dad7] Change-Id: I7aec27aca9c3e395e41332fe4e59d720042e0609 Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* selinux: add SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY to the list of netlink message typesPaul Moore2016-09-101-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 6a96e15096da6e7491107321cfa660c7c2aa119d upstream. The SELinux AF_NETLINK/NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG socket class was missing the SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY definition which caused SELINUX_ERR messages when the ss tool was run. # ss Netid State Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port Peer Address:Port u_str ESTAB 0 0 * 14189 * 14190 u_str ESTAB 0 0 * 14145 * 14144 u_str ESTAB 0 0 * 14151 * 14150 {...} # ausearch -m SELINUX_ERR ---- time->Thu Jan 23 11:11:16 2014 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1390493476.445:374): arch=c000003e syscall=44 success=yes exit=40 a0=3 a1=7fff03aa11f0 a2=28 a3=0 items=0 ppid=1852 pid=1895 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="ss" exe="/usr/sbin/ss" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1390493476.445:374): SELinux: unrecognized netlink message type=20 for sclass=32 Change-Id: I22218ec620bc3ee6396145f1c2ad8ed222648309 Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
* selinux/nlmsg: add XFRM_MSG_MAPPINGNicolas Dichtel2016-09-101-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit bd2cba07381a6dba60bc1c87ed8b37931d244da1 upstream (net-next). This command is missing. Change-Id: Ida52130382e42355e5f3b39134aa61a1ea98026d Fixes: 3a2dfbe8acb1 ("xfrm: Notify changes in UDP encapsulation via netlink") CC: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org> Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* selinux/nlmsg: add XFRM_MSG_MIGRATENicolas Dichtel2016-09-101-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | commit 8d465bb777179c4bea731b828ec484088cc9fbc1 upstream (net-next). This command is missing. Change-Id: Id2c9344ca1ab2c96e0b758ad1efb38e16cf23b86 Fixes: 5c79de6e79cd ("[XFRM]: User interface for handling XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE") Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* selinux/nlmsg: add XFRM_MSG_REPORTNicolas Dichtel2016-09-101-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | commit b0b59b0056acd6f157a04cc895f7e24692fb08aa upstream (net-next). This command is missing. Change-Id: I8fa3b1b9815296d3b001244d2212f79f5654bd01 Fixes: 97a64b4577ae ("[XFRM]: Introduce XFRM_MSG_REPORT.") Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* selinux/nlmsg: add XFRM_MSG_[NEW|GET]SADINFONicolas Dichtel2016-09-101-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | commit 5b5800fad072133e4a9c2efbf735baaac83dec86 upstream (net-next). These commands are missing. Change-Id: I3fd1d3d700592c653e1a5c5199125805d55aaa95 Fixes: 28d8909bc790 ("[XFRM]: Export SAD info.") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* selinux/nlmsg: add XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFONicolas Dichtel2016-09-101-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | commit 5e6deebafb45fb271ae6939d48832e920b8fb74e upstream (net-next). This command is missing. Change-Id: Id0a0d9bf7a4af98a8f761fec902d1296138a911f Fixes: ecfd6b183780 ("[XFRM]: Export SPD info") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* selinux/nlmsg: add XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFONicolas Dichtel2016-09-101-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2b7834d3e1b828429faa5dc41a480919e52d3f31 upstream (net-next). This new command is missing. Change-Id: If511000c19aa9af7220ff775d88ace9834b35dcb Fixes: 880a6fab8f6b ("xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink") Reported-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* UPSTREAM: selinux: fix bug in conditional rules handlingStephen Smalley2016-09-101-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (cherry picked from commit commit f3bef67992e8698897b584616535803887c4a73e) commit fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls") introduced a bug into the handling of conditional rules, skipping the processing entirely when the caller does not provide an extended permissions (xperms) structure. Access checks from userspace using /sys/fs/selinux/access do not include such a structure since that interface does not presently expose extended permission information. As a result, conditional rules were being ignored entirely on userspace access requests, producing denials when access was allowed by conditional rules in the policy. Fix the bug by only skipping computation of extended permissions in this situation, not the entire conditional rules processing. Change-Id: Ib925a69ad8030532752896e7a6f991b9b86b8a82 Reported-by: Laurent Bigonville <bigon@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: fixed long lines in patch description] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3 Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
* selinux: Android kernel compatibility with M userspaceJeff Vander Stoep2016-09-101-8/+61
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | NOT intended for new Android devices - this commit is unnecessary for a target device that does not have a previous M variant. DO NOT upstream. Android only. Motivation: This commit mitigates a mismatch between selinux kernel and selinux userspace. The selinux ioctl white-listing binary policy format that was accepted into Android M differs slightly from what was later accepted into the upstream kernel. This leaves Android master branch kernels incompatible with Android M releases. This patch restores backwards compatibility. This is important because: 1. kernels may be updated on a different cycle than the rest of the OS e.g. security patching. 2. Android M bringup may still be ongoing for some devices. The same kernel should work for both M and master. Backwards compatibility is achieved by checking for an Android M policy characteristic during initial policy read and converting to upstream policy format. The inverse conversion is done for policy write as required for CTS testing. Bug: 22846070 Change-Id: I2f1ee2eee402f37cf3c9df9f9e03c1b9ddec1929 Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
* selinux: extended permissions for ioctlsJeff Vander Stoep2016-09-1011-60/+834
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (cherry picked from commit fa1aa143ac4a682c7f5fd52a3cf05f5a6fe44a0a) Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Bug: 22846070 Change-Id: I1573d6b2d0ced27e82b6447318aa5b3065021a5b
* selinux: remove unnecessary pointer reassignmentJeff Vander Stoep2016-09-101-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (cherry pick from commit 83d4a806ae46397f606de7376b831524bd3a21e5) Commit f01e1af445fa ("selinux: don't pass in NULL avd to avc_has_perm_noaudit") made this pointer reassignment unnecessary. Avd should continue to reference the stack-based copy. Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: tweaked subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Bug: 22846070 Change-Id: I4aef4b95820e813c370525310e37f5da22d25efc
* selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate callJeff Vander Stoep2016-09-101-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use the ATTR_FILE attribute to distinguish between truncate() and ftruncate() system calls. The two other cases where do_truncate is called with a filp (and therefore ATTR_FILE is set) are for coredump files and for open(O_TRUNC). In both of those cases the open permission has already been checked during file open and therefore does not need to be repeated. Commit 95dbf739313f ("SELinux: check OPEN on truncate calls") fixed a major issue where domains were allowed to truncate files without the open permission. However, it introduced a new bug where a domain with the write permission can no longer ftruncate files without the open permission, even when they receive an already open file. (cherry picked from commit b21800f304392ee5d20f411c37470183cc779f11) Bug: 22567870 Change-Id: Id7c305e46beba5091c2c777529bd468216aae1c3 Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
* sched: cpufreq: Adds a field cpu_power in the task_structRuchi Kandoi2016-09-105-1/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | cpu_power has been added to keep track of amount of power each task is consuming. cpu_power is updated whenever stime and utime are updated for a task. power is computed by taking into account the frequency at which the current core was running and the current for cpu actively running at hat frequency. Bug: 21498425 Change-Id: Ic535941e7b339aab5cae9081a34049daeb44b248 Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
* cpufreq_stats: Adds the fucntionality to load current values for each frequencyRuchi Kandoi2016-09-101-28/+139
| | | | | | | | | | | | for all the cores. The current values for the cpu cores needs to be added to the device tree for this functionaly to work. It loads the current values for each frequecy in uA for all the cores. Bug: 21498425 Change-Id: If03311aaeb3e4c09375dd0beb9ad4fbb254b5c08 Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
* defconfig: enable CONFIG_UID_CPUTIMEMoyster2016-09-101-0/+1
|
* uid_cputime: Check for the range while removing range of UIDs.Ruchi Kandoi2016-09-101-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | Checking if the uid_entry->uid matches the uid intended to be removed will prevent deleting unwanted uid_entry. Type cast the key for the hashtable to the same size, as when they were inserted. This will make sure that we can find the uid_entry we want. Bug: 25195548 Change-Id: I567942123cfb20e4b61ad624da19ec4cc84642c1 Signed-off: Ruchi kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
* uid_cputime: Iterates over all the threads instead of processes.Ruchi Kandoi2016-09-101-3/+3
| | | | | | Bug: 22833116 Change-Id: I775a18f61bd2f4df2bec23d01bd49421d0969f87 Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
* uid_cputime: fix cputime overflowJin Qian2016-09-101-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | Converting cputime_t to usec caused overflow when the value is greater than 1 hour. Use msec and convert to unsigned long long to support bigger range. Bug: 22461683 Change-Id: I853fe3e8e7dbf0d3e2cc5c6f9688a5a6e1f1fb3e Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
* uid_cputime: Avoids double accounting of process stime, utime and cpu_power inRuchi Kandoi2016-09-101-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | task exit. This avoids the race where a particular process is terminating and we read the show_uid_stats. At this time since the task_struct still exists and we will account for the terminating process as one of the active task, where as the stats would have been added in the task exit callback. Bug: 22064385 Change-Id: Id2ae04b33fcd230eda9683a41b6019d4dd8f5d85 Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
* uid_cputime: Extends the cputime functionality to report power per uidRuchi Kandoi2016-09-101-2/+10
| | | | | | | | /proc/uid_cputime/show_uid_stats shows a third field power for each of the uids. It represents the power in the units (uAusec) Change-Id: I52fdc5e59647e9dc97561a26d56f462a2689ba9c Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
* proc: uid_cputime: fix show_uid_stat permissionJin Qian2016-09-101-1/+1
| | | | | Change-Id: Ice9084e39da599261df0be6dc305b817b50cfbbf Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
* proc: uid_cputime: create uids from kuidsAmit Pundir2016-09-101-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Create uids from kuids using from_kuid_munged(), otherwise we run into following build error and warnings: -------------------- CC drivers/misc/uid_cputime.o drivers/misc/uid_cputime.c: In function ‘uid_stat_show’: drivers/misc/uid_cputime.c:90:36: error: incompatible type for argument 1 of ‘find_or_register_uid’ drivers/misc/uid_cputime.c:54:26: note: expected ‘uid_t’ but argument is of type ‘kuid_t’ drivers/misc/uid_cputime.c:94:4: warning: format ‘%d’ expects argument of type ‘int’, but argument 3 has type ‘kuid_t’ [-Wformat] drivers/misc/uid_cputime.c: In function ‘process_notifier’: drivers/misc/uid_cputime.c:194:6: error: incompatible types when assigning to type ‘uid_t’ from type ‘kuid_t’ make[2]: *** [drivers/misc/uid_cputime.o] Error 1 -------------------- Change-Id: Ifecb98001f7fe2fac74d1ef3e1abd03d43fc9059 Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org> (cherry picked from commit b0f4decae627cf2d74e6f72c7ecb939c77d48625)
* proc: uid: Adds accounting for the cputimes per uid.jinqian2016-09-103-0/+242
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Adds proc files /proc/uid_cputime/show_uid_stat and /proc/uid_cputime/remove_uid_range. show_uid_stat lists the total utime and stime for the active as well as terminated processes for each of the uids. Writing a range of uids to remove_uid_range will delete the accounting for all the uids within that range. Change-Id: I21d9210379da730b33ddc1a0ea663c8c9d2ac15b
* kernel: make READ_ONCE() valid on const argumentsLinus Torvalds2016-09-101-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The use of READ_ONCE() causes lots of warnings witht he pending paravirt spinlock fixes, because those ends up having passing a member to a 'const' structure to READ_ONCE(). There should certainly be nothing wrong with using READ_ONCE() with a const source, but the helper function __read_once_size() would cause warnings because it would drop the 'const' qualifier, but also because the destination would be marked 'const' too due to the use of 'typeof'. Use a union of types in READ_ONCE() to avoid this issue. Also make sure to use parenthesis around the macro arguments to avoid possible operator precedence issues. Tested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* tcp: make challenge acks less predictableEric Dumazet2016-09-101-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS (RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic paper. This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes. Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus. Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting to remove the host limit in the future. v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period. Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2") Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* kernel: Change ASSIGN_ONCE(val, x) to WRITE_ONCE(x, val)Christian Borntraeger2016-09-101-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | Feedback has shown that WRITE_ONCE(x, val) is easier to use than ASSIGN_ONCE(val,x). There are no in-tree users yet, so lets change it for 3.19. Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* kernel: Provide READ_ONCE and ASSIGN_ONCEChristian Borntraeger2016-09-101-0/+74
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | ACCESS_ONCE does not work reliably on non-scalar types. For example gcc 4.6 and 4.7 might remove the volatile tag for such accesses during the SRA (scalar replacement of aggregates) step https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58145) Let's provide READ_ONCE/ASSIGN_ONCE that will do all accesses via scalar types as suggested by Linus Torvalds. Accesses larger than the machines word size cannot be guaranteed to be atomic. These macros will use memcpy and emit a build warning. Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
* defconfig: enable SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICTMoyster2016-09-101-0/+1
|
* ANDROID: restrict access to perf eventsJeff Vander Stoep2016-09-101-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add: CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT=y to android-base.cfg The kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl is set to 3 by default. No unprivileged use of the perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is changed. Bug: 29054680 Change-Id: Ie7512259150e146d8e382dc64d40e8faaa438917
* FROMLIST: security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_openJeff Vander Stoep2016-09-104-1/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When kernel.perf_event_open is set to 3 (or greater), disallow all access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Add a Kconfig symbol CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT that makes this value the default. This is based on a similar feature in grsecurity (CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PERF_HARDEN). This version doesn't include making the variable read-only. It also allows enabling further restriction at run-time regardless of whether the default is changed. https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/11/587 Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Bug: 29054680 Change-Id: Iff5bff4fc1042e85866df9faa01bce8d04335ab8
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2026-03-27 09:14:32 +0000