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authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2016-02-23 11:03:12 +0000
committerMoyster <oysterized@gmail.com>2016-11-07 13:44:31 +0100
commit8fac3cfb6219189dddcb120e7c20e56e29bae8ce (patch)
tree0b7968bbec0893ea4699a1361b09b87b4a27dc00
parent09ff9e3e6f2b17af0a824f5d99c4a859f4139bd1 (diff)
KEYS: Fix ASN.1 indefinite length object parsing
This fixes CVE-2016-0758. In the ASN.1 decoder, when the length field of an ASN.1 value is extracted, it isn't validated against the remaining amount of data before being added to the cursor. With a sufficiently large size indicated, the check: datalen - dp < 2 may then fail due to integer overflow. Fix this by checking the length indicated against the amount of remaining data in both places a definite length is determined. Whilst we're at it, make the following changes: (1) Check the maximum size of extended length does not exceed the capacity of the variable it's being stored in (len) rather than the type that variable is assumed to be (size_t). (2) Compare the EOC tag to the symbolic constant ASN1_EOC rather than the integer 0. (3) To reduce confusion, move the initialisation of len outside of: for (len = 0; n > 0; n--) { since it doesn't have anything to do with the loop counter n. Change-Id: I2a103f4c191ff6c463d68d6fe703edd96aa8f0ef Ticket: PORRIDGE-485 Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
-rw-r--r--lib/asn1_decoder.c16
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/lib/asn1_decoder.c b/lib/asn1_decoder.c
index 11b9b01fd..a076f368e 100644
--- a/lib/asn1_decoder.c
+++ b/lib/asn1_decoder.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ next_tag:
/* Extract a tag from the data */
tag = data[dp++];
- if (tag == 0) {
+ if (tag == ASN1_EOC) {
/* It appears to be an EOC. */
if (data[dp++] != 0)
goto invalid_eoc;
@@ -91,10 +91,8 @@ next_tag:
/* Extract the length */
len = data[dp++];
- if (len <= 0x7f) {
- dp += len;
- goto next_tag;
- }
+ if (len <= 0x7f)
+ goto check_length;
if (unlikely(len == ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH)) {
/* Indefinite length */
@@ -105,14 +103,18 @@ next_tag:
}
n = len - 0x80;
- if (unlikely(n > sizeof(size_t) - 1))
+ if (unlikely(n > sizeof(len) - 1))
goto length_too_long;
if (unlikely(n > datalen - dp))
goto data_overrun_error;
- for (len = 0; n > 0; n--) {
+ len = 0;
+ for (; n > 0; n--) {
len <<= 8;
len |= data[dp++];
}
+check_length:
+ if (len > datalen - dp)
+ goto data_overrun_error;
dp += len;
goto next_tag;