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<title>xavi/android_kernel_m2note/security/integrity, branch ng-7.1.2</title>
<subtitle>Unnamed repository; edit this file 'description' to name the repository.
</subtitle>
<id>https://gitea.privatedns.org/xavi/android_kernel_m2note/atom?h=ng-7.1.2</id>
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<updated>2019-07-06T10:00:41+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>xattr: Constify -&gt;name member of "struct xattr".</title>
<updated>2019-07-06T10:00:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-24T20:44:02+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:35e3f05d39c3bd0e4d96410ac6a996b5657da15c</id>
<content type='text'>
Since everybody sets kstrdup()ed constant string to "struct xattr"-&gt;name but
nobody modifies "struct xattr"-&gt;name , we can omit kstrdup() and its failure
checking by constifying -&gt;name member of "struct xattr".

Change-Id: I84a47af13e3c77b394218cc12ac8901d87b0fd69
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt; [ocfs2]
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Tested-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons</title>
<updated>2017-06-17T13:45:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ryan Ware</name>
<email>ware@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-11T23:58:44+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f114aadd04b1040a8cb44aa038dd0f168fa58c1c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1 upstream.

This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085.  The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12.  This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().

Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo &lt;xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware &lt;ware@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>first commit</title>
<updated>2016-08-15T02:19:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Meizu OpenSource</name>
<email>patchwork@meizu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-15T02:19:42+00:00</published>
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